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Telecommunications regulation should be viewed as an attempt to solve the
problem of financing large-scale public infrastructure over a sufficiently
long period of time to pose significant and perhaps prohibitive amounts of
risk. Investors are reluctant to commit capital to infrastructure if they
cannot be assured of a reasonable return on their investment. Pricing rules
in telecommunications are designed to protect incentives to invest in high-
cost networks. Pricing disputes in the American telecommunications
industry have raised serious questions over the extent to which public rules
are governed by the United States Constitution's promise that private
property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation. These
disputes are especially intense when they involve the price at which
incumbent network owners must sell unbundled network elements to
competitors seeking interconnection. This Article argues that attempts to
enforce a pricing rule based on a utility's historic record of prudent
investment lacks any plausible basis in American constitutional law. The
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misguided attempt to seek a constitutional solution to the problem of
network pricing arises from a fundamental misunderstanding of the so-
called regulatory compact. Rather, the problem of network pricing in highly
complex and technologically volatile infrastructural industries such as
telecommunications and electricity demands sophisticated legal tools such
as price-level regulation, transitional pricing rules such as avoided-cost
pricing and the long-run incremental cost rule for pricing unbundled access
to incumbent networks, reverse auctions to fulfill universal service
obligations, and tailored stranded cost recovery provisions. Reliance on a
metaphorical regulatory compact has inflicted serious harm to the law of
regulated industries. Accordingly, this obsolete metaphor should be
discarded.
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[L]inking tendrils of speech twine through the city blocks, spread
over pavements, grow out along broad parked avenues, speed with
the trucks leaving on their long night runs over roaring highways,
whisper down sandy byroads past wornout farms, joining up cities
and flllingstations, roundhouses, steamboats, planes groping along
airways; words call out on mountain pastures, drift slow down
rivers widening to the sea and the hushed beaches.'
I. INFRASTRUCTURE U.S.A.
Few legal issues have greater economic impact than the regulation of
"networks that distribute products or services over geographic space." 2
Estimates of the impact of policies governing so-called "infrastructure
industries" or "public utilities" 3 in the United States generally range in tens
of billions of dollars per year.4 Insofar as "static gains and losses from
regulation are probably small compared to the historical gains in welfare
resulting from innovation and productivity growth," 5 these policies' dynamic
effects may be even more impressive. Yet legal scholars rarely "give
adequate attention" to economic regulation, let alone related "considerations
of dynamic efficiency."
6
I JOHN Dos PASSOS, U.S.A. 2 (Library of America 1996) (1930).
2 Jost A. G6MEz-IBAfJEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS,
AND DISCRETION 4 (2003).
3 See id. (using these terms interchangeably).
4 See, e.g., PAUL TESKE, SAMUEL BEST & MICHAEL MINTROM, DEREGULATING
FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION: DELIVERING THE GOODS 75 (1995) (crediting truck
deregulation with $38 billion in annual consumer surplus); Robert W. Hahn & John A.
Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG.
233, 250 (1991) (estimating annual savings of $33.6 to $42.9 billion); Alfred E. Kahn,
Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 343
(1990) (claiming unspecified "billions of dollars each year"); Clifford Winston,
Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1263, 1284 (1993) (estimating an annual gain of $36 to $46 billion); cf
Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS
1, 23 (Martin Neil Baily et al. eds., 1997) (alleging that the delayed rollout of wireless
telephony inflicts roughly $33 billion in lost annual productivity).
5 Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1449, 1484 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
D. Willig eds., 1989).
6 Ha-Joon Chang, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 21 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 703, 721 (1997).
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Perhaps the fault lies with treating the law of regulated industries "as if
it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." '7
Even a cursory look at this body of law suggests an "echo of the infinite, a
glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law."'8
Contemporary jurisprudence recapitulates cultural history: today's law of
regulated industries "embodies the story of [this] nation's development
through [the] centuries" 9 and echoes the struggles that have transformed the
United States from an infant republic to a global superpower. The law of
regulated industries reflects the "sharp, often highly emotional, sometimes
violent economic and political combat" that shook the United States between
its Civil War and World War 11.10 Around the world, the construction and
maintenance of facilities providing water, energy, transportation, or
communications typically force governments to confront difficult issues such
as monopolization, coordination difficulties, threats to human health and the
environment, and distributional concerns such as universal access to basic
commodities and services.11 Infrastructure industries often attract close,
hostile legal attention precisely because they are usually "the first nationally
prominent big businesses to emerge from [an] industrial revolution."' 12 The
American variation on this legal theme illustrates in microcosm the "much
larger problem of the political risk of investing in emerging markets."13
The infrastructure industries that present the most intractable legal
problems are the massive networks whose value "depends on the total
number of users" and "becomes more valuable as additional customers are
connected to it."' 14 Even though the United States has outgrown its
7 Sheldon M. Novick, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAW 1 (Dover Publications 1991) (1902).
8 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 478 (1897),
reprinted in 110 HARv. L. REV. 991, 1009 (1997).
9 HOLMES, supra note 7, at 1.
10 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY:
DIFFERENT MODES OF BARGAINING AMONG INTERESTS 20 (1982).
11 See G6MEZ-IBaJEZ, supra note 2, at 4-6; cf Lois R. Lupica, Transition Losses in
the Electric Power Market: A Challenge to the Premises Underlying the Arguments for
Compensation, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 649, 652 n.6 (2000) (describing the American
economy's dependence on electrical infrastructure).
12 G6MEZ-IBAfIEZ, supra note 2, at 190.
13 Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1435, 1469 (2000).
14 David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to Promote Network
Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 523, 524 (1999); see also Wis. Tel. Co. v. R.R.
Comm'n, 156 N.W. 614, 621 (Wis. 1916) (recognizing that interconnection benefits all
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developmental phase, the legal treatment of infrastructure continues to play a
critical role in a putatively information-driven economy. Although economic
priorities in developed nations may have shifted from roads and sewers to
high-speed communications networks, the financing of infrastructure still
follows longstanding economic and political rules. The Internet today
inhabits roughly the same social space that railroads occupied in the Old
West, 15  right down to stories of rampant speculation, imprudent
overinvestment, and outlandish governmental largesse. The fare may have
changed from barbed wire to wireless broadband, but government is still
feeding favored guests at the "Great Barbecue." 16 Whatever the eventual
social impact of the Internet, it is already clear that many aspects of the
United States' information technology juggernaut depend on massive
subsidies favoring physical infrastructure and logical coordination. 17
The law of regulated industries has reached that "most difficult period in
the life of' any entity: "middle age."' 18 This body of law may be "no longer
what it once was but there is life in the old dog yet."'19 "[T]he history of
affected carriers by enabling each network's customers to call each other); Adam
Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 369, 398-99
(2004) (same). See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW
208-12 (1994); Chien-fu Chou & Oz Shy, Network Effects Without Network
Externalities, 8 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 259 (1990); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics
of QWERTY, 75 Am. ECON. REv. 332 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985); S.J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market
Failure?, 17 RES. L. & ECON. 1 (1995); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1998).
15 See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW (2002). The
Gilded Age had its own communicative novelties: the telegraph and the telephone. See
TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET (1998); Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems,
Free Markets, and Regulation ofInternet Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1177, 1238 (1998)
(observing that "electronic commerce is arguably as old as the telegraph"); cf HAROLD A.
INNIS, THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION 186 (1951) (describing how mechanized printing
and the telegraph turned journalists into people "who [write] on the backs of
advertisements").
16 See Eben Moglen, The Invisible Barbecue, 97 COLuM. L. REv. 945 (1997).
17 See generally Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal
Government Created Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1
(1999); Michael A. Geist, The Reality of Bytes: Regulating Economic Activity in the Age
of the Internet, 73 WASH. L. REv. 521, 525-30 (1998); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing
Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REv. 609, 615-19
(1998).
18 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977).
19 Id.
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public utility regulation consists of three major phases-legislative, judicial
and administrative."'20 Each phase opened with a watershed Supreme Court
decision. The 1877 case of Munn v. Illinois21 heralded the legislative phase,
while the path from the 1898 case of Smyth v. Ames 22 to the 1944 case of
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.23 marked the transition
from the judicial phase to the administrative. Hope Natural Gas signaled the
end of judicial involvement in ratemaking: "It is not theory but the impact of
the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said
to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry... is at an end." 24
Hope Natural Gas in particular unites the law of regulated industries
with the jurisprudential legacy of the New Deal.25 Hope Natural Gas
confirmed plenary federal power over an expanded conception of interstate
commerce. Even more prominently, Hope Natural Gas counseled judges to
defer to legislative and administrative framers of economic policy. Though
less celebrated than such landmarks as United States v. Carolene Products
Co.,26 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,27 and the Commerce Clause trilogy
of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,28 United States v. Darby,29 and
Wickard v. Filburn,30 Hope Natural Gas made a vital contribution to the
jurisprudential resolution that would stabilize American constitutional law
for decades.
Much of the New Deal settlement is unraveling. Federalism, thought as
recently as the 1990s to have passed into the mists of history, 31 rides again.
2 0 CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 180 (3d ed. 1993).
21 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
22 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
23 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
2 4 Id. at 602.
25 See Eric R. Claeys, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Takings Clause,
and Tensions in Property Theory, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 208 (2005) (observing that
Hope Natural Gas's "Realist view" of property "captures many assumptions about
takings that follow if the institution of private property needs to be reconciled to the
redistributive and welfarist aims of the post-New Deal regulatory state").
26 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
27 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
28 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
29 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
3 0 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
31 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485,




United States v. Lopez,32 Seminole Tribe v. Florida,33 and City of Boerne v.
Flores34 have "put a triple whammy on congressional authority. '35
Aggressive reinterpretation of the Commerce Clause, the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment heralds "a
mighty effort" to restore the states' putatively "rightful place."'36 In an age
when the Tenth Amendment has been transformed from a "truism"' 37 into a
jurisprudential wrecking ball, 38 the constitutional underpinnings of the law
of regulated industries are by no means inoculated against reconsideration.
Nothing lasts forever, and claims to truth are no exception.
"[R]egulatory measures are temporary expedients, not eternal
verities . . . ."39 Neither regulatory agencies nor the laws they implement are
immune from the cycles that define all living things. "[R]egulatory bodies,
like the people who comprise them, have a marked life cycle. In youth they
are vigorous, aggressive, evangelistic, and even tolerant. Later they mellow
and in old age ... they become ... either an arm of the industry they are
regulating or senile." 40 Periodicity in the law of regulated industries follows
the rhythm of grander political or even cultural cycles. 41
32 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
33 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
34 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
35 Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process,
and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1722
(2002).
3 6 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT
SIDES WITH THE STATES 8 (2002).
37 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The [Tenth] [A]mendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."); cf McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (describing the language
of the Tenth Amendment as "leaving the question, whether [a] particular power ... has
been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair
construction of the [Constitution as a] whole instrument").
38 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); cf Reno v. Condon, 528
U.S. 141 (2000).
39 Fed. Power Comm'n v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 489 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
40 JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH, 1929, at 71 (2d ed. 1961); see also
MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74 (1955)
("The life cycle of an independent commission can be divided into four periods:
gestation, youth, maturity, and old age.").
41 See generally GILMORE, supra note 18, at 96; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1986).
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The law has thus reached a crucial transition,42 perhaps even a
paradigm-shifting crisis.43 In the past generation, the law of regulated
industries "has undergone a great transformation." 44 Among the numerous
facets of this legal metamorphosis, a single source of anxiety has
commanded the lion's share of scholarly attention. The comprehensive
substitution of market-oriented mechanisms for conventional regulation of
entry, exit, rates, and firm structure has undermined quasicontractual
understandings between regulated firms and the government. In particular,
incumbent providers of infrastructure fear that they will lose the ability to
recoup their historical investments should the law move completely from
command-and-control regulation to open markets without compensating
these incumbents for losses attributable to that transition.
The prevailing "administrative" paradigm in the law of regulated
industries, traceable to Hope Natural Gas, counsels incumbent utilities to
couch their demands for relief in a distinctively Progressive idiom.
Advocates for relief from deregulatory anxiety should address their requests
to scientifically expert, politically accountable regulatory agencies. In the
spirit of Ashwander v. TVA, 45 subconstitutional remedies such as price-level
regulation, transitional rules such as avoided-cost pricing, reverse auctions
for universal service subsidies, and statutory stranded cost recovery should
represent the law's first, rather than last, resort.
Such levelheaded thinking rarely prevails in a legal academy that shuns
concrete, feasible proposals in favor of flamboyant, outrageous propositions
enjoying no realistic prospects of real-world success. 46 In the aftermath of
the terrifyingly destabilizing Telecommunications Act of 199647 and the
Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) aggressive implementation of
that statute,48 prominent scholars such as J. Gregory Sidak, Daniel Spulber,
42 See generally Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARv. L. REV. 509 (1986).
43 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
66-76 (2d ed. 1970) (describing "crisis" as the engine of intellectual change and the first
step toward an eventual paradigm shift).
44See generally Joseph D. Keamey & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLuM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
45 297 U.S. 288 (1936); see id. at 346-49 (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
46 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Gresham 's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3 CONST.
COMMENT. 307 (1986).
47 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
48 See In re Access Charge Reform, 7 Communications Reg. (P & F) 1209 (Fed.
Communications Comm'n 1997), affd sub nom. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523
(8th Cir. 1998); In re Access Charge Reform Price Cap Performance Review for Local
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and Christopher Yoo have advanced arguments that would compensate
public utility shareholders for all amounts prudently invested in the
construction and historic maintenance of legacy infrastructure as a matter of
the Contracts and Takings Clauses of the Constitution. The judicial remedies
advocated by these scholars would effectively constitutionalize specific, pro-
incumbent ratemaking methodologies. Arguments in this vein, ostensibly left
for dead after Hope Natural Gas's repudiation of Smyth v. Ames, have
suddenly regained the veneer of intellectual respectability.
The attempted reconstitutionalization of the law of regulated industries
lacks any plausible doctrinal basis. Arguments of the sort that Professors
Sidak, Spulber, and Yoo have applied to deregulatory transitions are simply
untenable, whether framed as a branch of Contracts Clause, Takings Clause,
or substantive due process jurisprudence. This harsh assessment actually
understates the degree to which these scholars have erred. Their notion of
"deregulatory takings" is wrong, staggeringly wrong. An observer reviewing
the annals of constitutional commentary would strain to identify another
proposal that has attracted so much scholarly attention on the basis of so
little legal merit. Indeed, it is mathematically impossible to state the ratio of
academic rhetoric to doctrinal support because it would require division by
zero.
Part II of this Article, "Sines of the Times: The Ages of American
Regulatory Law," will review the crucial transitional beacons in the law of
regulated industries. Honest exegesis of the controlling cases forecloses the
restoration of comprehensive judicial oversight of ratemaking. The case law
lends no support for the leading academic proposals to constitutionalize any
single ratemaking methodology. Scarcely a century after proclaiming judicial
ascendancy over economic regulation, the Supreme Court has renounced
judicial primacy over the lines of business, internal organization, and pricing
practices of public utility companies. Ironically, the sole aspect of Smyth v.
Ames that does endure today is the very rule that offends the theorists who
would effectively reconstitutionalize utility ratemaking. Smyth's "fair value"
rule, once derided as an absurdly unmanageable abstraction, has reemerged
as the analytical touchstone by which market-oriented regulatory policy
should be gauged.
Part II, "The Art of the Covenant: Reconsidering the Regulatory
Exch. Carriers, 11 F.C.C.R. 21,354 (1996); In re Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499
(1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366 (1999); In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997),
affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d
393 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1210 (2000), and cert. dismissed, 531 U.S.
975 (2000).
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Compact," translates the Supreme Court's regulatory decisions into a proper
understanding of the so-called "regulatory compact." The misguided
academic revival of the judicial phase in the law of regulated industries
arises from a fundamental misunderstanding of this enduring legal metaphor.
After tracing this metaphor from its origin in nineteenth century municipal
franchises to contemporary advocacy of direct governmental contracting
with private providers of infrastructure, I conclude that no variant of the
contractual approach to public utility law can supply workable rules for
financing highly complex and technologically volatile network industries.
Successful regulation of electricity and telecommunications demands
sophisticated legal tools beyond the institutional capacity of state or federal
courts. The project requires the technical proficiency and political
accountability that only regulatory experts can bring to bear. A proper
understanding of the "regulatory compact" counsels us to abandon this
ancient but obsolete legal metaphor.
II. SINES OF THE TIMES: THE AGES OF AMERICAN REGULATORY LAW
No golden age endures forever.... [T]he best and most creative
minds of a generation are drawn to a particular field.... After a
generation or two of intense activity the job is done; the best and
most creative minds of the next generation follow their genius into
new fields. But it will be a long time before anyone realizes that the
last great play has already been written, the last great symphony
composed.49
A. The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Confiscatory Ratemaking
1. The Legislative Phase
Public utility law in the United States-or at least its constitutional
component-is thought to have originated in Munn v. Illinois50 and the
Granger Cases,51 the substantive due process cases of 1877 that authorized
states to regulate certain lines of business in furtherance of the "public
49 GILMORE, supra note 18, at 49.
50 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
51 See Chicago v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877); Peik v. Chi. & N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164
(1877); Chicago v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877); Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Blake, 94
U.S. 180 (1877); Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1877).
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interest. '52 Munn v. Illinois empowered the states to curb the market power
of agricultural middlemen. Grain warehouses in Chicago straddled a narrow
bottleneck in the massive flow of grain from the farmers regions of the
Plains to hungry urbanites along the Atlantic. A mere fourteen warehouses,
too massive to be controlled even by the railroads, commanded the entire
"trade in grain" from "seven or eight of the great States of the West [to] four
or five of the States lying on the sea-shore. '53 Wheat, "the king of all
grains,"'54 has a global reach matched by few other crops.55 One of the
leading plants in humanity's larder, 56 wheat is grown widely and shipped
even further.57 The fungible nature of grain and the need to commingle many
producers' output begat a private currency system, based on grain receipts,
that was negotiable and redeemable among the city's warehouse operators.58
Confronted with the specter of a "'virtual' monopoly" over "the largest part
of inter-state commerce" between the Plains and the East, 59 the Court upheld
Illinois's ceiling on "charges for the storage of grain in warehouses at
Chicago." 60
Later that Term, the celebrated Granger Cases6 1 ratified another
innovation: state-law regulation of intrastate railroad rates. Insofar as rail
52 See, e.g., William J. Barron, The Evolution of Smyth v. Ames: A Study of the
Judicial Process, 28 VA. L. REV. 761, 763-70 (1942); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural
Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2335-37 (1995) (book review); Edmund
W. Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 313,
314 (1979); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 96-99 (1991).
53 Munn, 94 U.S. at 130-31.
54 O.E. ROLVAAG, GIANTS IN THE EARTH 110 (Lincoln Colcord & O.E. R61vaag
trans., 1927).
55 See Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1757 (2003); cf JAMES
LONGMIRE & WALTER H. GARDINER, ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., LONG
TERM DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE IN FEED AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS 2 (1984) (reporting
that ninety percent of wheat traded internationally is used as food).
56 See generally Robert Prescott-Allen & Christine Prescott-Allen, How Many
Plants Feed the World?, 4 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 365 (1990).
57 See generally Moshe Feldman et al., Wheats, in EVOLUTION OF CROP PLANTS 184,
184-92 (J. Smartt & N.W. Simmonds eds., 2d ed. 1995).
58 SeeMunn, 94 U.S. at 131.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 123.
61 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877); Peik v. Chi. &
N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chi. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179




regulation was designed to benefit farmers as shippers of cheap, bulky
commodities vis-A-vis city dwellers, rail regulation shared the political
economy that impelled the passage of the warehouse law in Munn. In
concert, Munn and the Granger Cases validated the cultural roots of a
country that grew up on the farm and "moved to the city."' 62 These decisions
authorized legislative efforts to ease the transition from an agrarian to an
industrial economy. From the end of Reconstruction until World War II, the
Supreme Court upheld many legislative efforts to tame "the various
stockyards" and warehouses "of the country as great national public utilities"
dominating "the flow of commerce from the ranges and farms of the West to
the consumers in the East."'63
These decisions also foreshadowed the regulatory context that would
eventually redefine the post-Civil War understanding of individual rights.
That project had already begun in an agribusiness case that predated Munn
and the Granger Cases. The 1873 Slaughter-House Cases64 upheld
Louisiana's police power over "noxious slaughter-houses" and the "large
and offensive collections of animals" intended to feed the masses of greater
New Orleans.65 In repelling objections by aggrieved abattoirs, the Slaughter-
House Cases focused the Reconstruction amendments on their original goal
of protecting freed slaves. 66 The Civil Rights Cases67 of 1883 invalidated the
public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Those
provisions had been aimed at innkeepers and common carriers, the very
businesses that Munn deemed to be "clothed with a public interest. '68 By
62 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 23 (1955).
63 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922); accord Chi. Bd. of Trade v.
Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 34-36 (1923). The Olsen Court noted that commodity futures
transactions:
on the Chicago Board of Trade are just as indispensable to the continuity of the flow
of wheat from the West to the mills and distributing points of the East and Europe,
as are the Chicago sales of cattle to the flow of stock toward the feeding places and
slaughter and packing houses of the East.
Id. at 36.
64 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
6 5 Id. at 64.
6 6 See id. at 67-68 (1873); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-35 (1880) ("One
great purpose of these amendments was to raise the colored race from that condition of
inferiority and servitude in which most of them had previously stood, into perfect
equality of civil rights with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the States.").
67 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
68 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877); see also Candeub, supra note 14, at
381-82; James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54
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insisting that the Fourteenth Amendment affected solely "State action of a
particular character" without reaching "[i]ndividual invasion of individual
rights,"69 the Supreme Court curbed Congress's power to punish "merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. ' 70 For their part, the
state laws arising from the Granger Cases would eventually yield Plessy v.
Ferguson.71
Within the specific context of economic regulation, Munn, the Granger
Cases, and the "public interest" standard heralded a short-lived "legislative"
age. The Granger Cases presaged the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,72
which in turn established the federal model for command-and-control
regulation of specific industries. 73 Well before the New Deal, the Supreme
Court acknowledged Congress's power "to control... all [intrastate] matters
having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that [federal]
control is essential or appropriate." 74 The Shreveport Rate Cases75 of 1914
thus extended federal authority over intrastate railroad carriages with the
potential to affect interstate commerce. Most important, Munn declined to
prescribe judicial review, under any constitutional theory, as a palliative
against ratemaking abuses: "the people must resort to the polls, not to the
FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 253-55 (2002); cf JIM Rossi, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND
PUBLIc LAW 45 (2005) (describing the modem application of "ancient common law"
duties that originally bound primordial "public utilities such as ferries, flour mills, and
railroads").
69 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11; cf United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640
(1882) (invalidating a federal anticonspiracy statute that was "directed exclusively
against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State or their
administration by her officers").
70 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); accord, e.g., United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423-
24 (1973); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966); see Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. at 24-25; see also id. at 13-14 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment limits
Congress to enacting "corrective legislation ... for counteracting" unconstitutional state
laws).
71 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
72 Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
73 See, e.g., Marshall J. Berger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The
Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1111, 1128
(2000); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 44, at 1325 ("The original [regulatory] paradigm
was established over 100 years ago with the enactment in 1887 of the Interstate
Commerce Act."); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1194-95 (1986).
74 Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914).
75 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
2006] 1277
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
courts." 76 As late as 1892, the Supreme Court suggested that federal courts
lacked power to review utility or railroad rates set by the states.77
2. The Judicial Phase
The "legislative" era heralded by Munn and the Granger Cases
evaporated quickly. Within three decades, independent judicial review of
law and facts enabled regulated firms to assail unfavorable ratemaking as
unconstitutional confiscation.78 The notoriously reactionary Supreme Court
of the Gilded Age crafted a vigorously protective doctrine from Munn's
modest origins. The "confiscatory ratemaking" doctrine and the closely
related "fair value" standard would eventually advance the ideology of
economic due process.79 Indeed, ratemaking controversies arguably
represented "[t]he most significant cases in the [Lochner-era] Court's
campaign to expand the definition of property and takings."80
Justice David Brewer proved pivotal in envisioning confiscatory
ratemaking as a taking.8' In Reagan v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co.,82 Justice
Brewer not only asserted the power of judicial review over rates8 3 but also
argued that unfavorable rates would effectively confiscate utility property.84
In Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,8 5 Justice Brewer reviewed
a federal statute that condemned a lock and dam and directed that just
76 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
77 See Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 546-48 (1892).
78 See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920).
79 See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890). See generally John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The
Constitutional Limits on Utility Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REV. 65 (1985); Robert L.
Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1116 (1942);
Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner.: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on
Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605 (1996); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding
the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate
Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984).
80 McUsic, supra note 79, at 616.
81 See, e.g., 2 JAMEs BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 1095-96 (1937);
Drobak, supra note 79, at 75-76, 80 n.65; Hale, supra note 79, at 1120; Siegel, supra
note 79, at 216-23.
82 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
83 See id. at 399.
84 See id. at 410.
85 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
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compensation exclude the condemned corporation's state-law "franchise ...
to collect tolls." 86 Although the Court upheld Congress's power to condemn
state franchises "even against [their] will," Monongahela held that Congress
"can no more take the franchise which the State has given than it can any
private property belonging to an individual. '87 As the Circuit Justice hearing
the case that became Smyth v. Ames, Justice Brewer perfected the analogy
between harsh ratemaking and eminent domain.88
The whole Court eventually embraced Justice Brewer's campaign to
distill the "principles of the takings clause" into a distinctive "constitutional
ratemaking doctrine." 89 Justice Brewer's uncle, Justice Stephen Field, first
murmured "confiscation" in his Munn dissent.90 Chief Justice Waite intoned
nine years after Munn that the "power to regulate is not a power to destroy,
and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation." 91 The elder Justice
Harlan, the eventual author of Smyth, acknowledged in 1896 that rates might
be "so unjust as to destroy the value" of utility property. 92 In 1897, one year
before Smyth, the Court formally announced what its decisions by then had
dictated: the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment had been incorporated
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 93
Legal history casts some doubt on this doctrinal progression. Bradley
Karkkainen has persuasively argued that the purported incorporation of the
Takings Clause never took place during the Smyth era, but rather in the 1978
case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.94 For our
purposes, what matters is not whether Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago95 actually incorporated the Takings Clause,
but whether the Supreme Court came to understand Smyth and Chicago as
86 Id. at 313.
87 1d. at 341. See generally Claeys, supra note 25, at 235-36 (describing
Monongahela).
88 See Ames v. Union Pac. Ry., 64 F. 165, 177-78 (C.C.D. Neb. 1894), aff'd sub
nom. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
89 Drobak, supra note 79, at 68.
90 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting).
91 Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886); accord Chi., Milwaukee &
St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 456 (1890); In re Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769 (1968).
92 Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896).
93 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
94 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see Bradley C.
Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the
Takings Muddle, 90 MiNN. L. REv. 826 (2006).
95 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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imposing a federal constitutional restraint against state-law ratemaking
decisions. Given a sufficiently persistent pattern of citations, law can turn
even outrageous myth into history.96 So it was with Smyth. Real or spurious,
the rooting of the confiscatory ratemaking doctrine in the Takings Clause
helped it survive the uprising against Lochner. This independent
constitutional foundation shielded Smyth during "the demise of economic
substantive due process." 97
Whatever its doctrinal underpinnings, Smyth transmogrified the Court's
rhetoric. By 1904 Justice Harlan could speak casually, even in dissent, of
"confiscatory rates." 98 Even though neither the Supreme Court's opinion in
Smyth nor the circuit court opinion by Justice Brewer used any form of the
word, "confiscation" became deeply, perhaps irretrievably, entrenched as the
toughest "verbal workhorse in ... utility regulation." 99 It mattered little that
"the Supreme Court did not exercise its authority to review rates extensively
or make the standards more specific for 25 years."'100 As a procedural matter,
the mere "threat of judicial review ... caus[ed] states to afford a full
adversarial hearing on rate matters and to create expert agencies to carry out
the task rather than do so by legislative action." 10 1 As contemporary law
recognizes, the mere prospect of judicial review, as distinct from a
presumption of unreviewability, can influence agency behavior even if a
particular administrative decision would survive judicial scrutiny. 10 2
Smyth's admittedly mythological allure packs enormous power within a
regulatory culture in which "the opposing sides" of any debate "are as likely
to be persuaded by mythology as by mathematics." 10 3 The presence of
William Jennings Bryan, 10 4 litigating a landmark case for Nebraska rather
96 Cf Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 531 (2005) ("On occasion, a
would-be doctrinal rule or test finds its way into our case law through simple repetition
of a phrase-however fortuitously coined.").
97 Drobak, supra note 79, at 68.
98 Int'l Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601, 614 (1904) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
99 Richard Goldsmith, Utility Rates and "Takings," 10 ENERGY L.J. 241, 261
(1989).
10 0 Louis SCHWARTZ, JOHN FLYNN & HARRY FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION 369 (6th ed. 1985).
101 Id.
102 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 840-55 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in
the judgment).
103 Jim Chen, Titanic Telecommunications, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 535, 543 (1996).
104 See Neil N. Bernstein, Utility Rate Regulation: The Little Locomotive that
Couldn't, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q. 223, 240. See generally MICHAEL KAZiN, A GODLY HERO:
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than serving as President, magnified Smyth's prominence within the
"folklore" of regulation. 10 5 Through his vivid depiction of railroad
ratemaking in The Octopus, novelist Frank Norris added Smyth to the
American literary canon. 106 Far from strangling the railroad octopus, rate
regulation fed the beast. The confiscatory ratemaking doctrine transformed
rail regulation from Granger's boon to Granger's bane.
Finally, Smyth steered the substantive basis for ratemaking toward "the
cost of providing the service" at issue "rather than some other basis,"
especially "the demand for the service."10 7 For much of the next century, the
ratemaking "methodology for establishing the cost of providing [utility]
service" proceeded according to "a formula implicit in the Smyth
opinion":108
RR = OC+ rB
where
RR represents the utility's revenue requirement.
OC represents operating costs.
B represents the rate base, consisting of utility property dedicated
to public service.
r represents the rate of return on the rate base.
Of the three factors affecting a regulated firm's revenue requirement
under Smyth, the task of determining the rate base posed the most
"embarrassing question."'1 9 The Court responded with two words: fair
value. Smyth held "that the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness
of rates ... must be the fair value of property being used by it for the
convenience of the public.""l 0 To demystify this admittedly baffling
formula, the Court offered a non-exhaustive list of criteria: "the original cost
of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the
amount and market value of [the utility's] bonds and stock, the present as
compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning
capacity of the property ... and the sum required to meet operating
THE LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN (2006).
105 Richard D. Cudahy, The Folklore of Deregulation (with Apologies to Thurman
Arnold), 15 YALE J. ON REG. 427 (1998).
10 6 See FRANK NoRRIs, THE OcTOPUS: A STORY OF CALIFORNIA 67-70 (1901).
107 SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 100, at 369.
108 Id.
109 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898).
110 Id. at 546.
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expenses.""'I  Directed to the valuation of the rate base, arguably the most
contentious query in cost-of-service regulation, Smyth's fair value standard
controlled ratemaking methodology in state and federal law as an
unwavering constitutional command for nearly half a century.
"Although the fair value rule [gave] utilities strong incentive to manage
their affairs well and to provide efficient service,"1 12 it also defied judicial
administration. Critics lamented that Smyth had consigned "[s]tate public
utility regulation" to "a mode of procedure ... contrary to that almost
universally established under State law, and calculated seriously to
embarrass the operation of the administrative method." 1 3 Smyth's fair value
standard represented public utility law's expression of Heisenberg's
Uncertainty Principle. 1 4 Rates hinged on a judicial determination of fair
value, but no court could determine fair value without anticipating the rates
the utility would earn. 115 The circular rule invited endless litigation. 116 Fair
value eventually "degenerated to proofs about how much it would cost to
reconstruct the [utility] asset in question, a hopelessly hypothetical, complex,
and inexact process."1 17 No other doctrine has ever contributed as much to
the lament that "[t]he Supreme Power who conceived gravity, supply and
demand, and the double helix must have been absorbed elsewhere when
public utility regulation was invented." 118
11 Id. at 546-47.
112 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1989); see also 1 ALFRED E.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 109-16 (1970)
(explaining how the fair value rule arguably yields the most socially efficient rates).
113 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 92 n.28 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
114 Cf Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers
Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1, 17-23 (1989) (explaining, by
analogy to quantum theory, how the mere act of applying constitutional doctrine
irreversibly alters a decisionmaker's perception of the underlying facts).
11 See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276, 292 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment); Robert L. Hale, The "Fair
Value" Merry-Go-Round, 1898 to 1938: A Forty-Year Journey from Rates-Based-on-
Value to Value-Based-on-Rates, 33 ILL. L. REv. 517 (1939); Siegel, supra note 79, at
246; cf Gerard C. Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts (pt. 2), 33 HARV. L.
REv. 1031, 1051 (1920) (describing fair value as a "juristic illusion").
116 See, e.g., Sw. Bell, 262 U.S. at 299-301 (Brandeis, J., concurring in the
judgment); John Bauer, The Establishment and Administration of a "Prudent
Investment" Rate Base, 53 YALE L.J. 495, 499-501 (1944).
117 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 n.5 (1989) (citing Sw. Bell,
262 U.S. at 292-94).
118 F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
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3. The Administrative Phase
A generation after Smyth, Justice Brandeis offered his cure for a
ratemaking methodology that Chief Justice Stone denounced as "the most
speculative undertaking ... in the entire history of [Anglo-American]
jurisprudence."' 19 In the 1923 case of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,120 Justice Brandeis advocated
the prudent investment, or historical cost, approach to ratemaking. In lieu of
estimating fair value according to the current replacement cost of utility
assets, Justice Brandeis proposed that shareholders receive a reasonable
return on all prudently invested capital, as measured by the historical "book
value" of the utility's rate base. 121 All that the regulated firm has bargained
for-and received-is a bond-like return. The government would owe
nothing further.
As a substantive matter, Justice Brandeis's prudent investment rule may
have rested on a fundamental miscalculation regarding the future course of
inflation. 122 Justice Brandeis mistakenly predicted that "the peak price
levels" experienced during World War I would undergo a "continuous
decline[]," as they had after the War of 1812 and the Civil War. 123 The
American economy did no such thing. In retrospect, Justice Brandeis's
preference for the prudent investment rule rested on a historical accident:
public utility law traces its origins to an era when inflation was largely
unknown. 124 Indeed, the regulatory path since the New Deal would
eventually expose the weaknesses of the prudent investment rule and revive
the fair value rule, at least as regulatory policy if not as constitutional
doctrine.
537 (1st ed. 1970); accord GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR THE
INFORMATION AGE 20 (1994); Stuart Buck, TELRIC vs. Universal Service: A Takings
Violation?, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 8 (2003).
119 West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 689 (1935) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
120 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
121 See id. at 291 (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
122 See A.J.G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 504-05 (1969);
Robert A. Webb, Utility Rate Base Valuation in an Inflationary Economy, 28 BAYLOR L.
REv. 823, 832-33 & n.37 (1976). See generally Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic
Imprecision: How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1375 (2003).
123 Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 304
n.16 (1923).
124 Cf Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911, 921 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of cert.) (describing "monetary inflation" as "a phenomenon familiar to the
nation's founders, but absent during much of the 19th Century").
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The administrative ease of the prudent investment rule nevertheless
swayed converts. Within a decade, the Supreme Court noted that "its
distinctive function in the enforcement of constitutional rights" counseled
avoidance of "any artificial rule or formula which changed conditions might
upset."'125 Justice Frankfurter complained bitterly that fair value was "useless
as a guide for adjudication."' 126 In the 1942 case of Federal Power
Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America,127 Chief Justice
Stone's majority opinion not only held that "[t]he Constitution does not bind
rate-making bodies to the service of any single formula or combination of
formulas,"'128 but also equated the constitutional standard with the statutory
"just and reasonable" formula of the Natural Gas Act and nearly every other
regulatory statute. 129 Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy nevertheless
withheld their assent from the majority opinion in order to castigate the fair
value rule as a fallacious "theory derive[d] from principles of eminent
domain" that "have no place in rate regulation."' 130
The end came swiftly. The landmark 1944 case of Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 13 1 explicitly upheld a rate based on
historical cost. 132 Justice Douglas reduced the inquiry to one of effects rather
than method: "It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts.
If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and
unreasonable, judicial inquiry ... is at an end."'133 So strongly did Hope
Natural Gas appear to endorse Justice Brandeis's position that rate-of-return
regulation "has been identified with historical cost ever since." 134 The
125 L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R.R. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287, 305 (1933).
126 Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
127 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
128 Id. at 586.
129 See id; see also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968)
(holding that "any rate selected by the Commission from the broad zone of
reasonableness permitted by the [Natural Gas] Act cannot properly be attacked as
confiscatory").
130 Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. at 602-03 (Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment).
131 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
13 2 See id. at 605.
133 Id. at 602; accord Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310, 314
(1989). See generally Robert L. Hale, Utility Regulation in Light of the Hope Natural Gas
Case, 44 COLUM. L. REv. 488 (1944); Robert W. Harbeson, The Demise of Fair Value,
42 MICH. L. REv. 1049 (1944).
134 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 500 (2002).
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regulatory consensus after Hope Natural Gas reached a "general agreement"
that the historical cost methodology "was primus inter pares."1
35
Hope Natural Gas's crushing blow ended the judicial phase in the law of
regulated industries. One year after Hope Natural Gas, the Supreme Court
squelched any suggestion that the nominal bar against confiscatory
ratemaking obliges the government to guarantee a continuing stream of
utility revenues in the face of exogenous competition or technological
obsolescence. The 1945 case of Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad
Commission136 observed that no agency is required "to fix rates ... on an
investment after it has vanished, even if once prudently made."' 137 As the
Fifth Circuit summarized Hope Natural Gas and Market Street Railway:
"The Fifth Amendment protects against takings; it does not confer a
constitutional right to government-subsidized profits."'
138
By virtue of erasing nearly all traces of judicial control over valuation
standards in ratemaking, Hope Natural Gas is widely considered to have
ended public utility law's distinctively judicial phase. 139 Both as an
interpretation of the statutory ratemaking formula of "just and reasonable"
rates and as the definitive constitutional case on confiscatory ratemaking,
Hope Natural Gas has approached the status of holy writ. 140 Cases decided
in the ensuing half-century confirmed Hope Natural Gas's landmark status
even though the methodology endorsed in that decision proved catastrophic.
The 1954 decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin1 41 ordered the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) to regulate wellhead sales of natural gas
by independent producers to interstate pipelines. This flawed decision forced
the federal government to set wholesale prices in a structurally competitive
market utterly unsuited to cost-of-service regulation. 142
In the decades after Phillips, the FPC "labored with obvious difficulty to
regulate a diverse and growing industry under the terms of an ill-suited
135 ld at 485.
136 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
137 Id. at 567.
138 Alenco Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 624 (5th Cir. 2000).
139 See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 20, at 181.
140 Cf California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 499 (1990) (according great respect to
"longstanding and well-entrenched decisions ... interpreting statutes that underlie
complex regulatory regimes").
141 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
14 2 See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAvOY, ENERGY REGULATION
BY THE FEDERAL POWER CoMMIssION 56-88 (1974); Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the
Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REv. 345
(1983).
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statute." 143 Cost-of-service regulation of wellhead gas became the
"outstanding example... of the breakdown of the administrative
process."' 44 As "intensely competitive vendors of a wasting commodity ...
acquired only by costly and often unrewarded search," whose "unit costs
may rise or decline with the vagaries of fortune," gas producers "cannot
usefully be classed as public utilities."'145
In the 1968 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,146 the Court took a relaxed
view of the constitutional constraints on ratemaking. The FPC subjected gas
in the Permian Basin to two price ceilings: "one area maximum price for
natural gas ... dedicated to interstate commerce after January 1, 1961," and
"a second, and lower, area maximum price for all other natural gas produced
in the Permian Basin."1 47 The FPC nevertheless "declined to calculate area
rates from prevailing field prices." 148 Rather, in an effort to determine the
national and regional costs of "finding and producing gas-well gas," the
Commission "derived the maximum just and reasonable rate" from
"composite cost data," based on "published sources" and "cost
questionnaires." 1 49 Insofar as the resulting area rates balanced "'the investor
and the consumer interests"' identified in the Natural Gas Act, the Court
found them "constitutionally permissible."' 150 The Permian Basin Cases thus
enabled the FPC to choose between individual rates for certain high-cost
producers and area rates for all others. 15 1
After Permian Basin, a name synonymous with extinction, 152 the
confiscatory ratemaking doctrine all but evaporated. Six years after that
decision, the Court allowed the FPC to adopt "one level of just and
reasonable rates for small producers and another for large producers," again
143 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 756 (1968).
144 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON REGULATORY
AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 54 (Comm. Print 1960); accord Permian Basin, 390
U.S. at 758.
145 Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 756-57.
146 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
147 Id. at 759-60.
148 Id. at 761.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 770 (quoting Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,
603 (1944)).
151 See id. at 768-74. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases and the Regulatory Determination of Price, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 191 (1967).
152 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BENTON, WHEN LIFE NEARLY DIED: THE GREATEST MASS
EXTINCTION OF ALL TIME 9 (2003); D.H. Erwin, The End-Permian Mass Extinction, 21
ANN. REv. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 69 (1990).
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without constitutional hesitation. 153 The Court erased any doubt on this point
in a 1989 decision contesting a state public utility commission's refusal to
base rates on a nuclear power plant whose construction was admittedly
prudent when begun, but which had since failed to be "used and useful."
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch154 upheld the exclusion of amounts invested
in the unused nuclear plant from the rate base: "Today we reaffirm [the]
teachings of Hope Natural Gas."155 Three concurring Justices stressed that
"no single ratemaking methodology is mandated by the Constitution, which
looks to the consequences a governmental authority produces rather than the
techniques it employs."'156 Neither Duquesne nor any other Supreme Court
decision "require[s] courts to engage in a takings analysis whenever an
agency opens a previously regulated market to competition."'' 57 In substance
if not in form, the Supreme Court of Ohio came perilously close in 1992 to
stating the contemporary significance of the confiscatory ratemaking
doctrine when it asserted that the "'Constitution no longer provides any
special protection for the utililty investor." ' 158
Duquesne affirmed Hope Natural Gas's jurisprudential approach even as
it revived Smyth's substantive ratemaking methodology. Duquesne
recognized that regulatory determinations of utility rates might benefit from
"a return to some form of the fair value rule."' 159 It had already become
apparent that the then "emergent market for wholesale electric energy could
provide a readily available objective basis for determining the value of utility
assets." 160 Duquesne vividly illustrated the ongoing transformation of
electricity regulation. Even as Duquesne enabled Pennsylvania to deny
recovery of a utility's investment in an unused nuclear plant, the Court
recognized that a viable wholesale market would enable regulators to value
electric generation assets entirely without reference to historic investment.
In other words, even though Smyth erred in privileging judicial over
legislative and administrative competence, that decision correctly embraced
153 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 390 (1974).
154 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
155 Id. at 310.
156 Id. at 317 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices White and O'Connor joined Justice
Scalia's concurrence.
157 Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 437 (5th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1210, 1223 (2000), and cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 975 (2000).
158 Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 589 N.E.2d 1292, 1300 n.8 (Ohio
1992) (quoting Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Cornn'n, 447 N.E.2d 733, 740
(Ohio 1983)).
159 Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 316 n.10.
160 Id.
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the fair value rule as a matter of substantive policy. The roots of this
realization run at least as deep as Hope Natural Gas. In his dissent to that
decision, Justice Jackson correctly predicted the impossibility of using a
cost-based methodology to price natural gas. In gas production, Justice
Jackson observed, the "service one renders to society ... is measured by
what" the producer "gets out of the ground, not by what he puts into it, and
there is little more relation between the investment and the results than in a
game of poker."161 Although the prudent investment rule does measure, "at
least roughly," the "amount and quality of service rendered by [a] ... utility"
according to "the amount of capital it puts into the enterprise," that rule "has
no rational application where there is no such relationship between
investment and capacity to serve." 162
Justice Jackson's conclusion in Hope Natural Gas resonates throughout
the law of regulated industries. Where viable markets exist for infrastructure,
regulatory estimates of prices should be based on those markets rather than
some historic measure of cost. Although historic-or "sunk"-costs "are
usually visible, ... they should always be ignored when making economic
decisions."1 63 Sunk costs differ in a critical respect from other forms of cost,
especially "opportunity cost" in the sense of "the value of the best forgone
alternative use" of resources. 164 All other notions of cost are partially or
wholly forward-looking. 165 Insofar as "cost to an economist is a forward-
looking concept," costs already incurred "do not affect decisions on price
and quantity."'1 66 Because the "historical investments" in legacy networks
are "sunk costs" and have no relevance to contemporary business decisions,
prices in a competitive market react solely "to current costs."1 67 The need to
ignore historic costs in making "current pricing decisions," whether through
competition or regulatory mechanisms designed to emulate competition, is
"particularly significant in industries such as telecommunications which
depend heavily on technological innovation."' 168  Forward-looking
161 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 649 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
162 Id.
163 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS § 7.1, at 199
(2d ed. 1992).
16 4 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 56 (2d ed. 1994).
165 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 499 n.17 (2002).
166 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1, at 7 (3d ed. 1986).
167 Alenco Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2000).




ratemaking methodologies, based "on the costs an efficient carrier would
incur (rather than the costs [that] incumbent carriers historically have
incurred)," strongly "encourage carriers to act efficiently."'169 Focusing on
"forward-looking costs" to the exclusion of "historical, booked costs"
represents a crucial legal commitment in managing "the transition from
monopolistic to competitive" markets in historically regulated infrastructure
industries. 170
By the time Duquesne reached the Supreme Court, this key insight had
already penetrated the law of regulated industries. As of 1989, aggressive
reform of many industries, including electricity, demanded unbundling of
services to customers and imposed interconnection obligations vis-i-vis
competitors "[i]n industries and segments where services ha[d] been bundled
together through vertical and horizontal integration."' 17 1 The common law
did not oblige a common carrier to carry its competitors' traffic. 172 In 1886
the Supreme Court announced that "regulation of matters of this kind is
legislative in its character, not judicial," and any legal obligation to
interconnect with competitors "must come, when it does come, from some
source of legislative power."173
Roughly one century later, regulatory reformers enthusiastically seized
this opportunity for legislative override. The Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) 174 authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to prescribe rules requiring electric utilities to purchase
power from qualifying cogenerators and small power producers. 175 For a
crucial five years after the Supreme Court upheld FERC's decision to set the
price for purchases of power generated by "qualifying facilities," or "QFs,"
at a rate equal to the full avoided cost of power that the purchasing utility
169 Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 407 (5th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1210, 1223 (2000), and cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 975 (2000).
170 Alenco, 201 F.3d at 615.
171 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 44, at 1363-64.
172 See Express Package Cases, 117 U.S. 1, 21, 26-28 (1886); see also Candeub,
supra note 14, at 385 (arguing that no case has ever "overturned the common law rule
that railroads must accept traffic or freight at public junctions and depots from everyone,
including competitors"); cf Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 611 n.44 (1985) (declining, almost exactly one century after the Express Package
Cases, to resolve whether antitrust law requires firms with monopoly power to provide
their competitors with access to "essential facilities").
173 Express Package Cases, 117 U.S. at 29.
174 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117.
175 See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (2000).
12892006]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
would otherwise have generated for itself,176 FERC's full-avoided cost rule
transformed PURPA's "statutory ceiling" into "the floor price" for
wholesale electricity supplied by QFs. 177 PURPA thus "fueled the growth of
a significant independent power producer sector, which challenged
incumbent utility market power in electric power generation."' 178
In 1988, a decade after PURPA, FERC abandoned the administrative
determination of avoided cost in favor of competitive bidding. 179 Having
prohibited "states [from] impos[ing] rates exceeding avoided cost,' 180 FERC
also forswore its own determination of full avoided cost and instead allowed
qualifying facilities to engage in competitive bidding. 181 PURPA was
eventually subsumed into the Energy Policy Act of 1992,182 which adopted a
176 See Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 405
(1983).
177 Steven J. Ferrey, Shaping American Power: Federal Preemption and
Technological Change, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 78 (1991).
178 ROSSI, supra note 68, at 62.
179 See Administrative Determination of Full Avoided Costs, FERC Statutes &
Regulations T 32,457 (1988), summarized in 53 Fed. Reg. 9331 (1988); see also
Regulations Governing Bidding Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 9324 (1988); Regulations
Governing Independent Power Producers, 53 Fed. Reg. 9327 (1988).
180 Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 43 F.E.R.C. 61,067, at 61,195 (1988), stayed,
43 F.E.R.C. 61,547, at 62,361 (1988), appeal dismissed sub nom. Occidental Chem.
Corp. v. FERC, 869 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1989), dismissed as moot, 70 F.E.R.C. 61,014
(1995), reconsid, denied, 71 F.E.R.C. 61,034 (1995); see also S. Cal. Edison Co., 70
F.E.R.C. 61,215 (1995), reconsid, denied, 71 F.E.R.C. 61,269 (1995); Conn. Light &
Power Co., 70 F.E.R.C. 9 61,012 (1995), reconsid denied, 71 F.E.R.C. 61,035 (1995).
For discussions of FERC's power under Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore,
487 U.S. 354 (1988), and Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953
(1986), to preempt state ratemaking, see Ferrey, supra note 177; Clinton A. Vince &
John S. Moot, Federal Preemption Versus State Utility Regulation in a Post-Mississippi
Era, 10 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1989).
181 See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. v. N.H. Elec. Coop., 83 F.E.R.C. T 61,224, at 61,995-
96, 62,000-01 & n.20 (1998); S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. 61,215, at 61,675-77
(1995), reconsid, denied, 71 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,078-80 (1995); Enron Power Enter.
Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. 61,193 (1990); Doswell Ltd. P'ship, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,251 (1990).
182 Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776. For overviews of the 1992 Act's impact on
PURPA and the electricity industry, see Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The
Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility
Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 763; Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case
Study in Government Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827 (1998); Jeffrey D. Watkiss &
Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992-A Watershed for Competition in the
Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447 (1993).
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simpler, technologically neutral category of exempt wholesale generators183
and expanded the scope of reform from generation to wholesale wheeling. 184
Throughout these regulatory changes, the jurisprudential sequence from
Smyth through Hope Natural Gas, Permian Basin, and Duquesne has
retained considerable importance. Even though the Supreme Court has never
invalidated a rate as confiscatory since the Justices repudiated the
constitutional underpinnings of the fair value rule, confiscatory ratemaking
remains part of takings doctrine. Duquesne unequivocally stated that "the
Constitution protects utilities from being limited to a charge for their
property ... which is so 'unjust' as to be confiscatory."' 185 The "power to
regulate," it bears remembering, "is not a power to destroy."' 86
4. Confiscation and Network Access
The interconnection and unbundling strategy that began with PURPA
has revived interest in the confiscatory ratemaking doctrine. Obligations to
interconnect and to sell network elements on an unbundled basis preserve the
regulatory rigor once associated with the valuation of a utility's rate base
under conventional ratemaking. Contemporary regulation imposes "a new set
of regulatory obligations ... on the owners of [remaining] bottleneck
facilities."' 187 Regulation of "those market segments that have [residual]
natural monopoly characteristics" effectively imposes "new common carrier
duties," now directed "toward ... competitors" rather than "traditional
customers." 188 This is not deregulation unbound; the Telecommunications
Act and kindred statutes have "marked a shift towards a different style of
regulation known as 'access regulation.""' 18 9
Mandatory access requires regulators to set the price at which a
183 See Administrative Determination of Full Avoided Costs, 63 Fed. Reg. 51,310,
51,311 (1998).
184 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j, 824k (2000). Wheeling is the "transfer by direct
transmission or displacement [of] electric power from one utility to another over the
facilities of an intermediate utility." Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,
368 (1973).
185 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989) (citing Covington &
Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896)).
186 R.R. Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886); accord Covington, 164 U.S. at
593 (1896); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769 (1968).
187 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 44, at 1364.
188 Id.
189 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 885, 890 (2003).
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regulated incumbent must sell unbundled network elements to competitors
requesting interconnection. Thanks to the transformation of the electricity
market by PURPA and the Energy Policy Act, regulators may value a
utility's generating capacity according to prevailing prices for an equivalent
amount of power on the wholesale market and (rather pointedly) without
reference to amounts historically invested in acquiring that capacity. This
approach traces its origins not to the prudent investment approach advocated
by Justice Brandeis, but rather to the fair value approach prescribed by
Smyth.
Nowhere has this issue been more significant than the dispute over the
Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost Rule (TELRIC) used by the FCC
to set the price at which incumbent local telephone companies must sell
unbundled network elements to their competitors. The Telecommunications
Act requires incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to permit
competitors to interconnect190 and to offer unbundled network elements for
sale. 191 Rates for unbundled elements must be "just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory."' 192 Those rates "may include a reasonable profit" and
"shall be based on the cost.., of providing the interconnection or network
element."' 193 But "cost" must be "determined without reference to a rate-of-
return... proceeding."' 194
In 1999 the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's authority to "design a
pricing methodology" that could bind state regulators. 195 The FCC
proceeded to price unbundled network elements according to "forward-
looking economic cost."' 196 This definition of cost represented "the sum of:
(1) The total element long-run incremental cost of the element" and "(2) A
reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs." 197 The FCC
defined "common costs" as "costs efficiently incurred in providing a group
of elements ... that cannot be attributed directly to individual elements."' 98
In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC,199 the Supreme Court upheld
190 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (2000).
191 See id. § 251(c)(3).
192 Id.
193 Id. § 252(d).
194 Id.
195 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 385 (1999).
196 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a) (2005).
197 Id
19 8 Id. § 51.505(c)(1).
199 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
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TELRIC.200 Verizon explicitly endorsed Hope Natural Gas, Permian Basin,
and Duquesne.20 Unlike earlier techniques, however, TELRIC is an overt,
even aggressive, variant of the fair value rule. Rather than looking backward
at an incumbent carrier's prudent investment, TELRIC prices network
elements according to "the use of the most efficient telecommunications
technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration,
given the existing location of the incumbent [carrier's] wire centers." 20 2
TELRIC's concept of "forward-looking economic cost" represents
"something distinct from the kind of historically based cost generally relied
upon in valuing a rate base after Hope. '203 TELRIC reflects not the
historical cost of a network, but rather the imputed "cost of operating a
hypothetical network built with the most efficient technology available" to
an incumbent carrier.2°4 Quite pointedly, TELRIC excludes all opportunity
cost; "forward-looking economic cost," as defined by the FCC, does not
include "opportunity costs" such as "the revenues that the incumbent LEC
would have received for the sale of telecommunications services, in the
absence of competition. '20 5
In upholding TELRIC, the Supreme Court resurrected a regulatory truth
that had been submerged by the founding mythology of the prudent
investment rule. Justice Brandeis's formulation of the prudent investment
rule and its endorsement in Hope Natural Gas have obscured the regulatory
burden of historical cost. Rate-of-return regulation based on historical cost,
not its fair value alternative, has become the ratemaking methodology that is
hobbled by bad accounting and manipulative litigation. "It is now generally
accepted that replacement cost is superior to historical cost as a measure of
market value, because . . . '[a] competitive marketplace values assets, not at
their historical price, but at their replacement value .. ."'206 As Verizon
admitted, "the 'book' value or embedded costs of capital presented to
traditional ratemaking bodies often [bear] little resemblance to the economic
value of the capital. '20 7
2 00 See generally Michael J. Legg, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC-
Telecommunications Access Pricing and Regulator Accountability Through
Administrative Law and Takings Jurisprudence, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 563 (2004).
201 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 483-84, 501-02, 524-25.
202 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (2005).
203 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 495.
204 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 375 n.3 (1999).
205 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(d)(3) (2005).
206 Spulber & Yoo, supra note 189, at 903 (alteration in original) (quoting STEPHEN
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 38 (1982)).
207 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 517-18.
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TELRIC addressed incumbent carriers' asymmetrical access to pricing
information by "basing ... valuation on the market price for most efficient
elements."20 8 Incumbents enjoy no "unfair advantage" in proceedings over
rates "figured by reference to a hypothetical element. '20 9 The rule has
dramatically improved state ratemaking cases, which historically were so
dominated by incumbents that these proceedings epitomized regulatory
capture. "TELRIC rate proceedings are surprisingly smooth-running affairs,"
essentially bloodless battles between "conflicting economic models
supported by expert testimony" that typically end with state-law regulators
adopting "some predictions from one model and others from its
counterpart. '210 Verizon did not question the FCC's preference for TELRIC
"over alternative fixed-cost schemes that preserve home-field advantages for
the incumbents." 21'
In fairness, replacement cost might not always outperform historical cost
as the basis for valuing utility assets. A regulated firm required to provide
access to rivals might demand replacement cost if "the present 'cost' of a
network.., is much greater than" the "backwards-looking 'historical' costs"
incurred "when the network was first erected. '212 If the utility has ample
capacity at the margin, as an electric utility would when it is required to
grant access to its poles for the benefit of cable television and broadband
operators, some rate of compensation besides market value should be
constitutionally adequate.2 13
This modest exception aside, constitutional doctrine is now settled.
Verizon has endorsed Duquesne's conclusion that "the fair value rule gives
utilities strong incentive to manage their affairs well and to provide efficient
service." 214 Verizon could not "say whether the passage of time will show
competition prompted by TELRIC to be an illusion, but TELRIC appears to
be a reasonable policy for now, and that is all that counts." 215 Verizon has
ended any argument that the Telecommunications Act or the Constitution
requires a regulatory agency to value utility assets according to historical
cost for purposes of setting the price of unbundled network elements sold to
an incumbent firm's competitors. There is no longer a "serious constitutional
2 0 8 Id. at 518.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 522.
211 Id.
2 12 Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1367 (llth Cir. 2002).
2 13 See id. at 1370-71.
214 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1989).
215 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 523.
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question" whether any ratemaking "methodology [consciously] divorced
from investment actually made will lead to a taking of property. 216
B. Access Pricing Without Constitutional Constraint
1. The Fallacy of "Deregulatory Takings"
Although the law consists of "what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious," 217 the absence of legal support rarely if ever
constrains scholarly ingenuity. J. Gregory Sidak, Daniel Spulber, and
Christopher Yoo have launched intricate but meritless efforts to revive
robust judicial safeguards against allegedly confiscatory ratemaking. After
elaborating their theories through law review articles, 218 Professors Sidak
and Spulber advocated the reconstitutionalization of the law of regulated
industries in Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract: The
Competitive Transformation of Network Industries in the United States.219
This 1997 book argued that the Constitution compels the government to
compensate incumbent firms for losses attributable to changes in regulatory
policy rather than unexpected economic circumstances or technological
obsolescence. 220 Under the terms of what the authors called an enforceable
"regulatory contract" insulating regulated firms from official perfidy,221 the
appropriate remedy for governmental breach should be just compensation
under the Takings Clause of the Constitution. 222
216 Id. at 523.
217 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897), reprinted in 110 HARv. L. REV. 991, 994 (1997).
218 See generally J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and
Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 851 (1996); J. Gregory Sidak &
Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled
Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLuM. L. REV. 1081
(1997); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of
Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (1997); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F.
Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON
REG. 117 (1998).
219 j. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES
IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).
220 Id at 106-07.
221 See id. at 268-72.
222 See id. at 213-81. The Takings Clause provides that "private property" shall not
"be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; cf First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315
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Professors Sidak and Spulber characterized regulated firms'
"nonsalvageable investments" such as "an electrical generation plant or a
telecommunications switch" as the very sort of reasonable "'investment-
backed expectation' interest[s]" that the law should shield. 223 Incumbent
utilities will find it difficult or impossible to recover these costs should the
"advent of competition" in electricity, telecommunications, and other
network industries continue apace.224 So-called "stranded costs," known also
"as 'transition costs,' . . . include utility companies' costs that were incurred
prior to deregulation that are above market prices during deregulation and
costs incurred in the transition from monopoly status to competitive market
status." 225
Deregulatory Takings objected in particular to mandatory
interconnection and unbundling schemes typified by TELRIC. Mandatory
access schemes expose incumbent utilities to potentially staggering stranded
costs. In electricity, "stranded investment costs" often refer to costs that a
transmission company "incurs due to any surplus in generation (or other)
facilities resulting from the introduction of open access to its transmission
services."226 As "current customers ... take advantage of open access to
purchase power from competing entities," the incumbent utility must manage
"excess capacity and the costs which that entails." 227
[W]hen a utility spends money to build power generation or
transmission facilities it plans to use to serve the needs of a particular
customer, and that customer takes its business elsewhere, the utility is
suddenly left with more facilities than it needs to serve its remaining
customers. Unless it can find a new customer to serve with its excess
facilities, the money it spent on acquiring the new facilities will be
"stranded." 228
Incumbent telecommunications carriers have protested that TELRIC
(1987) (observing that just compensation is a remedy prescribed by constitutional text).
223 SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 219, at 12 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
224 In re Passaic County Utils. Auth. Petition, 728 A.2d 323, 327, 321 N.J. Super.
186, 194, rev'd, 753 A.2d 661, 164 N.J. 270 (1999); see also Mass. Inst. of Tech. v.
Dep't of Pub. Utils., 684 N.E.2d 585, 588, 425 Mass. 856, 858 n.4 (1997).
225 N. Am. Natural Resources, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 41 F. Supp. 2d
736, 740 n. 3 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
226 Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
227 Id.
228 Ass'n of Pub. Agency Customers, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d
1158, 1180 (9th Cir. 1997).
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"does not incorporate their 'historical' or 'embedded' costs," more precisely
defined as costs that an incumbent "incurred in the past to build its local
network and has not yet fully recovered" under state-law rates.229 TELRIC
allegedly "underestimates their costs to provide interconnection and
unbundled access and results in prices that are too low, effectively requiring
[incumbents] to subsidize their new local service competitors. '" 230
In an effort to provide constitutional ammunition against these
arrangements, Professors Sidak and Spulber have argued that "[m]andatory
interconnection and unbundling constitute a government-ordered, physical
invasion of the property of the incumbent regulated firm." 231 Deregulatory
Takings did not state an explicit legal basis. The phrase "deregulatory
taking," felicitous as it was fallacious, did not appear in a published federal
judicial opinion before 1998.232 To the extent that Deregulatory Takings
asserted a claim under the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, it ran
headlong into Supreme Court precedent "precisely to the contrary" of the
untenable "proposition that such a contract ... can be implied in the absence
of an explicit right. '233 The Contracts Clause gives "public utility investors
... precisely what they are able to bargain for, no more and no less." 234 If
indeed government has committed contractual breach, "many terms of the
regulatory deal are missing or unclear."235
Not surprisingly, the phrases "deregulatory taking" and "regulatory
contract," when conscripted into action as actual legal arguments, have
performed abysmally. One Arizona court rejected a claim that regulators had
broken their "regulatory contract" with an incumbent telephone carrier. 236
229 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 793 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd in relevant
part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
230 Id.
231 SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 219, at 232.
232 See Bell At. Corp. v. United States, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-7375, at 98-5606 (E.D.
Pa. 1998); Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 1386, 1394-95 (N.D. Fla.
1998); see also Rossi, supra note 68, at 104-05.
233 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains,
108 YALE L.J. 801, 812 (1999); see also id. at 811 (quoting Chief Justice Taney's
statement that "in grants by the public, nothing passes by implication," Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 546 (1837)); id. at 816-17 ("Literally
dozens of times, ... the Supreme Court has reiterated and consistently adhered to the
Charles River Bridge prescription that contracts with the government are to be strictly
construed against the grantee.") (footnote omitted).
234 Id. at 816; accord Claeys, supra note 25, at 239.
235 Rossi, supra note 68, at 116.
236 See U.S. W. Communications, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 3 P.3d 936, 197
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Rejecting the carrier's argument that it enjoyed a "contractual" relationship
with the state's corporation commission, the court observed that cases
referring to a regulatory contract "speak[] descriptively or metaphorically,"
without establishing "an actual contract" or "contract remedies. '237 A New
York court has refused to grant stranded costs on a "regulatory compact"
theory.238 Most devastatingly of all, a federal district court squarely rejected
J. Gregory Sidak's contention, as an expert witness, that municipal
franchises are contracts enforceable under state law.23 9
In a 2003 Cornell Law Review article cowritten with Christopher Yoo, 240
Daniel Spulber resumed his campaign to constitutionalize the pricing rules
governing mandatory interconnection and unbundled access. This article
more clearly named its source of legal authority. Regimes mandating access
to legacy networks and setting prices on unbundled elements, Professors
Spulber and Yoo argue, should be subjected to the "physical takings"
doctrine outlined in cases such as Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV
Corp.241 In Loretto, a New York statute required rental property owners to
acquiesce in the installation of cable equipment for the benefit of tenants.
Loretto held that this scheme imposed "a permanent physical occupation
authorized by government" and thereby effected "a taking without regard to
the public interests that it may [have] serve[d]." 242 Professors Spulber and
Yoo contend that this per se rule should govern mandatory access
schemes. 243
Its legal merits aside, Loretto provides intriguing facts suggestive of
other Supreme Court decisions that supply the proper rule governing
mandatory access. Loretto blended rent control with cable television.
Economic regulation of rental housing has enjoyed a long history of
presumed constitutionality. The real estate market is clothed with what
Munn called the "public interest.'"244 Analogizing rate regulation with rent
Ariz. 16 (1999).
237 Id., 3 P.3d at 941-42, 197 Ariz. at 21-22.
238 See Energy Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 653 N.Y.S.2d 502, 513-14 (Sup. Ct.
1996).
239 See Bell At. Corp. v. United States, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-7375, at 98-7380 (E.D.
Pa. 1998).
240 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 189.
241 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S.
114 (1951); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
242 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
243 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 189, at 947-59.
244See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1944); Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135, 157 (1921).
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control is admittedly difficult, especially in light of Justice Brandeis'
assertion that valuation for ratemaking purposes cannot be equated with
valuation in condemnation proceedings, even though both legal contexts are
governed by the Takings Clause. 2
45
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has consistently declined to analyze
residential rent control under Loretto's per se rule.246 "The government
effects a physical taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to
the physical occupation of his land."' 247 Rent control, however, even when
combined with significant limit on the landlord's ability to convert property
from indefinite occupation "at below-market rent," does not compel a
"physical invasion of property. ' 248 Unless a controversy fits one of "two
relatively narrow categories," one for "permanent physical invasion[s]" and
the other for "regulations that completely deprive an owner of 'all
economically beneficial us[e]' of her property," 249 it falls under the more
generous standard of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York. 250 That test hinges on "the magnitude of a regulation's economic
impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property
interests." 251
Even more directly on point, the Supreme Court rejected the application
of Loretto in FCC v. Florida Power Corp.,252 a 1987 case challenging the
federal supervision of rates charged by incumbent owners of the utility poles
that provided "the only practical physical medium for the installation of
television cables." 253 Florida Power concluded that Loretto's rule regarding
245 See Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell. Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276,
310-11 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
246 See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 12 n.6 (1988) (declining to hold
"that rent control is per se a taking").
247 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992).
248 Id.; see also Fresh Pond Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983)
(dismissing an attempted use of Loretto to invalidate a rent control ordinance for failure
to raise a substantial federal question).
249 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)).
250 438 U.S. 108 (1978); cf Claeys, supra note 25, at 207 (observing that the
doctrinal frameworks for confiscatory ratemaking, physical occupation, and Penn
Central's multifaceted test "exhaust all the important possibilities in takings law").
251 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
252 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
253 Id. at 247; cf. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534
U.S. 327 (2002) (upholding the application of the the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 224, to pole attachments that provide high-speed Internet access over cable).
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permanent physical occupations did not prevent the FCC from "review[ing]
the rents charged by public utility landlords" and paid by "cable company
tenants renting space on utility poles. '254 In the context of utility
interconnection, Florida Power confirms what rent control cases have
established in the context of real estate.255 When "government ...
intervene[s] in the marketplace to regulate rates or prices that are artificially
inflated," whether those rates govern housing or telecommunications, the
appropriate constitutional framework is the lenient check against
confiscatory ratemaking.256
These cases, including Florida Power, do provide the slightest opening
for the per se rule governing physical occupations, and Professors Spulber
and Yoo enthusiastically exploit the gap. Takings jurisprudence has not
formally foreclosed the application of Loretto whenever the government
compels a property owner, "over objection, to rent his property or to refrain
in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy. '257 The Court has, however,
consistently distinguished constitutional contraints on ratemaking from the
takings doctrine that governs physical occupations. 258 Although some lower
courts have applied the per se rule in cases requiring physical collocation of
telecommunications equipment, 259 these exceptional cases establish the
primacy of Hope Natural Gas's more relaxed standard in all other
ratemaking settings. Indeed, one lower federal court has rejected the
application of Loretto to access pricing, holding that "[t]here is no precedent
for finding that the compulsory lease" of unbundled network elements
"constitutes a 'physical taking"' of telephone company equipment. 260
Another has rejected a takings challenge even as to the collocation
254 Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 252.
255 See Paul W. Garnett, Forward-Looking Costing Methodologies and the Supreme
Court's Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 7 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 119, 122 & n.19
(1999).
256 See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 11-12.
257 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528 (1992); see also Fla. Power, 480
U.S. at 251-52 n.6; cf Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987);
Fresh Pond Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875, 877 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
258 See, e.g., Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 252; Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U.S. 575, 603 (1942).
259 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1445-46 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
GTE Nw. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 900 P.2d 495, 504, 321 Or. 458, 474 (1995), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1155 (1996).




Without regard to his scholarly partners, Daniel Spulber has adhered to a
consistent position regarding the relative relevance of Loretto and Hope
Natural Gas in ratemaking cases. From Deregulatory Takings in 1997
through his 2003 Cornell article, Professor Spulber has argued that the
Constitution requires government to compensate legacy network owners for
investments stranded by regulatory reform. The absence of legal support for
this campaign has not spurred Professor Spulber to elaborate "the fine points
of a principle that will," in his apparently "confident" prognosis, "in time...
command [judicial] support. ' 262 Professor Spulber's persistence from 1997
through 2003 surprisingly ignores the intervening 2002 decision in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. FCC.263 The Supreme Court's latest word on
TELRIC has reinforced the inapplicability of the physical takings doctrine to
ratemaking, even in the context of mandatory interconnection and unbundled
access. Tellingly, Verizon does not even mention Loretto; the Takings
Clause framework that Verizon applied was that of Hope Natural Gas.
In their 2003 article, Professors Spulber and Yoo acknowledged the
Court's persistent distinction between physical takings and confiscatory
ratemaking before proceeding to ignore it.26 4 This deliberate disregard for
prevailing law demonstrates how the Takings Clause "has become the 'last
resort of constitutional arguments.' 265 Although Florida Power nominally
declined to declare which takings standard would govern a law requiring
interconnection and unbundled access,266 every other indication-especially
Verizon's striking silence-suggests that the Justices are disinclined to
reconstitutionalize valuation standards in the fashion of Smyth v. Ames.
Pending further notice, if a form of utility regulation has "satisf[ied] the 'end
result' test of Hope," that policy will not "be subjected to some additional
test for a 'regulatory taking." ', 267
We would reach this result even if we engaged takings jurisprudence
through first principles and deductive reasoning. 268  Attempts to
261 See GTE S. Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517 (E.D. Va. 1998).
262 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
263 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
264 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 189, at 934-36, 942-43.
265 Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 602 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 208 (1927)).
266 See FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251-52 n.6 (1987).
267 Goldsmith, supra note 99, at 256.
268 Cf Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 226 (1994) (embracing a "Euclidian"
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constitutionalize a single ratemaking rule are "tethered neither to the text of
the Takings Clause nor to the basic justification for [reviewing] regulatory
actions" under that clause.269 The overarching purpose of the Takings
Clause--"to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole" 27 0-has no real meaning in ratemaking.2 71 "[R]ate regulators do not
allocate burdens between the 'public' on the one hand and the 'few' on the
other"; they balance "the cost of utility service between large classes of
investors and consumers." 272 Utility investors enjoy an overwhelming
advantage in information, wealth, and political sophistication. 273 Their
superior ability to bear risk and to mitigate damage from unforeseen
contingencies are the very attributes that justify the imposition of liability in
virtually every other context.274 To shift the risk of legal change onto
ratepayers would perversely invite investors to enter as many regulatory
arrangements as possible, the better to secure public indemnification
"against the risks of changing technology and new entrants. '275
The substantial intellectual veneer of the campaign to reconstitutionalize
ratemaking masks an even more impressive absence of legal support. For
their trouble, Professors Sidak, Spulber, and Yoo have done little more than
identify a judicial mirage, "appearing to some [observers] but not to others,
and assuming any form desired by the beholder. '276 Annoying as the habit
methodology that accepts "certain basic postulates concerning [constitutional] structure
and political theory" and deduces doctrines as though they were theorems).
269 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 529 (2005).
270 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); accord, e.g., Lingle, 544
U.S. at 537; Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
271 See Rossi, supra note 68, at 112 (arguing that this formula is "not a central
concern in utility regulation").
272 Goldsmith, supra note 99, at 255; see also Gulf States Utils. Co. v. La. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 578 So. 2d 71, 116 (La. 1991) (observing that confiscatory ratemaking
occurs only when the government "fail[s] to consider the legitimate interests of the utility
and its investors ... and to weigh those interests against the competing concerns of
ratepayers" (emphasis added)).
273 See Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEx. L. REV. 297, 318
(1998).
274 See Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law
and Economics of Implicit Contracts, 11 J. REG. EcoN. 41, 43 (1997); James Boyd, The
"Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: Should Stranded Costs Be Recoverable?,
ENERGY J., 1998, at 69 (1998).
275 Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, supra note 273, at 316.
276 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 681 (1980)
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may be, the Supreme Court retains its freedom to disregard arguments
"supported by all the law professors in the land."'277 The high court,
presumably the exclusive arbiter of its own precedents,278 continues to
distinguish "the per se rule of Loretto" from the "constitutional calculus of
reasonableness" based on "traditional Fifth Amendment standards,"
especially as they govern the "regulation of maximum rates or prices. '279
Even if Loretto did govern mandatory access schemes, this change in
takings law would have no material impact. Professors Spulber and Yoo
wield Loretto as if it were Lochner unplugged, an intellectually dignified
alternative to the discredited ideology of economic due process. 280
Substantive due process, in any event, is an independent constitutional
constraint with "no proper place in ... takings jurisprudence. '281 Unlike a
violation of substantive due process, official action that effects a taking may
still proceed as long as the private property in question is "taken for public
use" and the government provides "just compensation. ' 282 The former
constraint is practically nonexistent; the latter merely reframes judicial
review of ratemaking as a question of "just compensation" rather than the
existence vel non of a taking. The Takings Clause "does not bar government
from interfering with property rights"; it simply "requires compensation 'in
the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. '283
Under the lenient definition delivered in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff,284 "[t]he 'public use' requirement is ... coterminous with the scope
of a sovereign's police powers. '285 In its most recent case on point, the
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
277 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995); see also Kazmier v.
Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 531 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he support of even [a] prominent ...
academician is an inadequate substitute for ... recent Supreme Court precedent.");
Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the Supreme
Court's opinion is the law, "whatever law professors or even professional historians may
say"), vacated, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999).
278 See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 237 (1997); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 180 (1990) (plurality
opinion); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
279 FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 253 (1987).
280 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
281 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
282 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
283 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (emphasis added)).
284 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
285 Id. at 240.
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Supreme Court reaffirmed that "public use jurisprudence has wisely
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of
the takings power."286 Where any "exercise of the eminent domain power is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause." 287 Under a
takings doctrine that allows "the government's pursuit of a public purpose"
to "benefit individual private parties,"288 open access in the name of
subjecting an entrenched monopolist to competition will surely suffice.289
The lone constitutional issue that remains is whether network elements
offered through mandatory access are adequately priced. That was the
question presented in Verizon, and whether one reaches it through the
confiscatory ratemaking doctrine or Loretto's per se rule makes no
difference. Even a categorical concession that mandatory access effects a per
se taking does not answer the "real question": whether the regulatory "price
structure" represents "just compensation or not."' 290 That query leads
inexorably to the deferential standard of Hope Natural Gas and Duquesne;
as one critic of TELRIC has conceded, a court applying Loretto must
eventually "consult the confiscatory rate doctrine."291 Even if they are
"inapposite" in determining whether a taking has occurred, "rate-of-return
principles" control the question of what compensation would be just.292
The amount ultimately awarded to the prevailing landlord in Loretto was
a single dollar.293 One dollar was what the state cable commission initially
offered, and it remained the measure of just compensation throughout the
litigation.294 Installing cable infrastructure affirmatively enhanced the
286 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005).
287 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
288 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666.
289 Cf Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) ("If those who govern the District
of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.").
290 Buck, supra note 118, at 36.
291 Id.; see also Claeys, supra note 25, at 236-37.
292 Buck, supra note 118, at 37.
293 See A $1 Cable Fee for TV Hookup Upheld by State, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1983,
at B3; Candeub, supra note 14, at 429.
294 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 423-24
(1982) (reporting that New York's cable television commission had originally "ruled that
a one-time $1 payment is the normal fee to which a landlord is entitled" for the physical
intrusion attributed to the cable); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446
N.E.2d 428, 431 (N.Y. 1983) (remanding the case for further consideration by the cable
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disputed apartments' value, and nominal damages discharged any
governmental obligation to the landlord. In the context of mandatory access,
the payment of an adequate rate for unbundled network elements should
extinguish all constitutional objections. Neither Loretto nor the confiscatory
ratemaking doctrine impairs the inherent police power to force
interconnection and unbundled access. Takings doctrine merely defines the
circumstances under which just compensation must issue and the amount of
compensation that would be "just." The proper measure of just
compensation, as Loretto illustrates, may be minimal.
2. Simply Priceless
No pricing rule associated with a mandatory access scheme has ever
been ruled unconstitutional. In light of such futility, one must question why
Gregory Sidak, Daniel Spulber, and Christopher Yoo have struggled so
mightily and so fruitlessly to reconstitutionalize ratemaking. The bootless
attempt to cram regulatory valuation standards into Loretto's physical
takings doctrine stems from an apparent desire to establish putatively
"market-based" prices as the benchmark for network elements provided by
an incumbent to its competitors. 295 This plea represents merely the latest
manifestation of a longstanding quest to subject all regulatory pricing to the
efficient component pricing rule (ECPR).296 The principal distinction
between the ECPR and TELRIC's forward-looking approach is that the
ECPR would compensate an incumbent for the opportunity cost lost through
compulsory transactions with competitors, particularly revenues that the
incumbent would have received had the law never undertaken to stimulate
competitive alternatives. The ECPR states in formal terms what Eric Claeys
has tentatively suggested as a baseline for pricing network elements acquired
through the Telecommunications Act's mandatory access provisions: the
commission).
295 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 189, at 949-58.
2 9 6 See generally, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOwARD
COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 95-97 (1994); SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 219, at
283-305; Alfred E. Kahn & William E. Taylor, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to
Competitors: A Comment, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 225, 228-30 (1994); Jean-Jacques LaFont
& Jean Tirole, Access Pricing and Competition, 38 EUR. EcoN. REv. 1673 (1994);
Alexander C. Larson & Dale E. Lehman, Essentiality, Efficiency, and the Efficient
Component-Pricing Rule, 12 J. REG. ECoN. 71 (1997); Robert D. Willig, The Theory of
Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 109 (Harry M.
Trebing ed., 1979); Robert D. Willig, William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Parity
Pricing and its Critics: A Necessary Condition for Efficiency in Provision of Bottleneck
Services to Competitors, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 145 (1997).
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"discounted present value of the rates" that incumbent carriers would have
"expected to recover in each state" had Congress never passed the Act and
had the FCC never adopted TELRIC. 297 By contrast, TELRIC's definition of
"forward-looking economic cost" excludes "opportunity costs" such as "the
revenues that the incumbent LEC would have received ... in the absence of
competition." 298
True to the admonition that the law must distinguish "what is
economically wise" from that which is "legally permissible," 299 I shall not
seriously dispute the ECPR as policy. 300  Confiscatory ratemaking
jurisprudence has unequivocally announced that regulators are "not bound to
the use of any single formula or combination of formulae in determining
rates. '30 1 "The balance of advantage[s]" among ratemaking methodologies
"is sufficiently close that.., current constitutional strictures" grant an ample
regulatory zone of discretion.30 2 It is certainly within the realm of reasoned
argument to defend the ECPR on the grounds that compensating today's
incumbents, who, after all, were yesterday's entrants, will encourage
tomorrow's innovators to develop infrastructure. 30 3 Moreover, consistent
with the insight that shared property is more expensive to define in the first
instance and to patrol over the long haul, 304 regulators may spurn forced
access, especially if regulatory prices for legacy infrastructure are stingy, as
an invitation to fierce, wasteful litigation. 30 5
297 Claeys, supra note 25, at 239.
298 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(d)(3) (2005).
299 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 652 (1944)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
300 Cf Candeub, supra note 14, at 429 (inviting the reader to "[a]ssume that [the
ECPR] is legally and economically unassailable").
301 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602.
302 Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 338 (2005).
303 See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman & Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in
Telecommunications: Iowa Utilities and Verizon, 2002 SuP. CT. REv. 41, 67 (2003);
Allan T. Ingraham & J. Gregory Sidak, Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of
Equity: Does TELRIC Pricing Increase Risk for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers?,
20 YALE J. ON REG. 389, 404 (2003).
304 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1382
(1993); cf. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk
Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129, 134 (1998) (observing
how crows, evidently aware of property's high cost, "dispense with their normal
territoriality when food is plentiful"). See generally Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory
of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
305 See Michael A. Heller, The UNE Anticommons: Why the 1996 Telecom Reforms
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By the same token, no court conscious of regulation's dynamic impact-
let alone the law's repudiation of a judicially dominated approach to
ratemaking-would ever constitutionalize the ECPR. Among ratemaking
methodologies, the ECPR is hardly the reformer's choice. Compensating
incumbents for lost business perpetuates the high prices and diminished
output that characterize any monopoly, and legal endorsement of an
incumbent monopolist's expected income stream will almost certainly
strangle downstream innovation.306 At worst, the ECPR awards "full pre-
entry profits, all the way up to the full monopoly level."'30 7 The resulting
technological "lock-in" is inimical to every progressive instinct animating
this dynamic field.30 8 As Professors Sidak and Spulber have admitted, "legal
analogies to physical invasion of real property" lose their power "[a]s value
in the economy arises to a greater relative extent from intellectual property
and information-based assets than from land. '309 It is almost banal to say
that firms today accrue much of their value in "intangible resources" such as
"ideas, know-how, information, inventions, goodwill, and the like."'310
The ECPR is most attractive when legacy networks successfully exploit
geography and other physical determinants of productivity that have retained
their importance in an information-based economy. 311 The ECPR is more
popular in settings that put a lower premium on innovation, such as railroads
and water markets. Within telecommunications, the ECPR may provide a
Blocked Innovation and Investment, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 275, 285 (2005).
306 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and
Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?, 40
ANTITRUST BULL. 557 (1995); Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, The
Inefficiency of the ECPR Yet Again: A Reply to Larson, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 429 (1998).
307 Nicholas Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR, in DOWN TO THE
WIRE: STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 140, 144
(Allan L. Shampine ed., 2003); accord Candeub, supra note 14, at 425.
308 See generally Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of
Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000); Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The
Persistence of Discrimination, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 31 (2003); Daria Roithmayr, Locked
in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 197 (2004).
309 SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 219, at 3.
310 Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 7 (2004);
cf Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) ("'Taking[s]'
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.").
311 See, e.g., RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS ... AND How
IT'S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 6 (2002) ("Place
has become the central organizing unit of our time, taking on many of the functions that
used to be played by firms and other organizations.").
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useful baseline for reforming the formula by which incumbent LECs charge
other carriers for completing phone calls over legacy wireline networks. The
ECPR may allow a "monopoly or bottleneck infrastructure provider and its
customers to negotiate agreements about access charges and related issues,"
presumably after regulators have already opened the network for the benefit
of competitors. 312 The ECPR also ensures that "vertically unbundled
industries produce their services using their most efficient components," a
regulatory objective reflecting the same efficiency concerns underlying
Ramsey pricing. 313
This seemingly abstract debate over the constitutional dimensions of
ratemaking has real consequences. Of the three available pricing rules-fair
value, prudent investment, and the ECPR-the ECPR is likeliest to set
network element prices at the highest level, while TELRIC's interpretation
of fair value would probably yield the lowest prices. Adopting the ECPR
would preemptively award stranded costs to incumbents and thereby throttle
structural reform of utility markets. Though it offends incumbent carriers
and their shareholders, TELRIC pointedly excludes opportunity costs from
its definition of "forward-looking economic cost. '314 Barring administrative
abandonment or legislative repeal, TELRIC is the law of the land.
Much of the frustration with TELRIC arises from its assumption that
incumbents should bear the brunt of a regulatory transition. Those losses
may indeed be economically significant. Incumbents, however, have not
endured constitutionally cognizable legal injury. The rhetoric of
"deregulatory takings" erroneously assumes that mandatory access has cost
incumbent utilities a sacrosanct right to exclude. Although the common law
did not compel common carriers to carry their competitors' traffic, 315 the
FCC has required local exchange carriers "to connect interexchange
carriers" and to fulfill "a duty of access to customers." 316 Historically
speaking, local telephone franchises-preempted since 1996 insofar as they
"prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide
any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service" 317-rarely granted
312 G6MEz-IB lEZ, supra note 2, at 260.
3 13 Id. On the pricing methodology traceable to Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to
the Theory of Taxation, 37 EcoN. J. 47 (1927), see generally Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
ICC, 985 F.2d 589, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1993); William P. Rogerson, New Economic
Perspectives on Telecommunications Regulation, 67 U. CHi. L. REv. 1489, 1491-92
(2000).
314 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(d)(3) (2005).
315 See sources cited supra note 172.
316 Claeys, supra note 25, at 228; see also id. at 232.
317 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000).
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exclusivity, but rather gave "permissive authorization" to build local
exchanges. 318
It is worth consulting wisdom from a setting distinct from this one but
not so distant as to be irrelevant.3 19 Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act
makes it unlawful to "take any [endangered] species. '320 Section 10
authorizes incidental take permits upon approval of a habitat conservation
plan. 321 Officials seeking to temper section 9's perceived harshness have
granted section 10 permits to blunt the perverse incentive to "shoot, shovel,
and shut up." 322 Responsive enforcement transformed section 10's
"previously obscure and rarely used permit provision" into "the centerpiece
of... endangered species and ecosystem conservation policy. '323 Within the
law of regulated industries, TELRIC likewise represents the "opening
gambit[] in a prolonged bargaining process. ' 324 A harsh "penalty default"
can force recalcitrant parties to divulge information that regulators
desperately need.325 It is equally plausible to characterize the "deregulatory
takings" argument as a default rule in its own right, but one that
presumptively favors "compensation" for legal transitions that upsets "the
preferences of a majority of the firms that contract with the government. '326
318 See William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of
the Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1037, 1047 (1997); George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories
of Regulation " Debate, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 289, 303 (1993).
319 For sources comparing environmental and utility regulation, see Bernard S.
Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in
Regulating the US. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1354-89 (1993);
Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity Markets, 40
WAKE FoREST L. REV. 497, 517-28 (2005).
320 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000).
321 See id § 1539(a).
322 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 691 (1995).
323 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory
Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 970 (2003).
324 Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 317
(1999); see also David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental
Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35 (2000).
325 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989); Randy E. Barnett, The
Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 887
(1992); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 706 (1999).
326 Rossi, supra note 68, at 97; see also id. at 99.
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This recharacterization of the ECPR, however, merely recasts the struggle
over TELRIC as the very sort of substantive regulatory dispute that courts
are unfit to settle.
To the extent that the effort to constitutionalize the ECPR represents an
attempt to foreclose reasoned argument over stranded costs, litigation offers
a highly inappropriate solution to this politically contentious debate.
Stranded costs have resulted from "a shift in utility rate philosophy from a
rate design based on 'cost plus rate of return' to a market-driven rate." 327
"Of course, the term 'stranded costs' is something of a misnomer, for
someone always pays for them." 328 The very use of the word "stranded"
implies that the costs at issue "are 'shipwrecked"' and that utility
shareholders "are the innocent victims of [official] misadventure. 329
Incumbent utilities justifiably fear that regulatory reform typically "means
that the stranded cost bell will toll for some of them. Naturally, they think
that is a bad idea."' 330 Just as naturally, however, if consumers were
sufficiently informed and organized to resist the iron quadrangle of self-
serving industries, craven legislators, captured bureaucrats, and awestruck
judges,331 they too might object just as vociferously to defraying incumbent
utilities' stranded costs.
Forcing consumers to bear stranded costs is "the antithesis of
competition." 332 Any incentives fostering prudent investment disappeared
long ago. Opposition to stranded cost recovery expresses the Realist instinct
that full compensation of incumbents, especially under conditions of rapid
technological change, is not needed "to guarantee efficient long-term
investment in utility infrastructure. '333 Whether achieved by litigation or by
327 Ass'n of Pub. Agency Customers, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d
1158, 1180 (9th Cir. 1997).
328 Id.
329 ROSSI, supra note 68, at 101.
330 Bonneville, 126 F.3d at 1180.
331 See generally, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983); Steven P. Croley, Theories of
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1998);
Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market
Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43 (1988); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by
Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. 22 (1971); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. 3 (1971).
332 Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
333 Claeys, supra note 25, at 209. See generally Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private
Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 187, 191-93, 216-19 (2004)
1310 [Vol. 67:1265
REGULATORY COMPACT
lobbying, stranded cost recovery effects a naked wealth transfer, and a
backward-oriented one at that. Worst of all, the political economy of
regulation enables incumbents to seize any failure, such as the California
electricity crisis of 2000-01, 334 as a rhetorical bludgeon against reform.33 5
As the technological, legal, and political suppositions accompanying original
investments in legacy infrastructure fade further into the past, the
anachronistic obsession with costs sunk long ago becomes the dead hand of
the law of regulated industries.
Finally, at the risk of indulging in the "trivial ritual" 336 of invoking
"[n]ew technology [as] the easy answer to everything," 337 I shall invoke the
broader "policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new
technologies and services to the public." 338 Though the notion sounds
hackneyed, the FCC does have a mandate "to promote ... policies and
purposes ... favoring diversity of media voices, vigorous economic
competition, [and] technological advancement. '339 The Telecommunications
Act was intended not only to "secure lower prices and higher quality
services" but also to "encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies." 340 TELRIC's reliance on hypothetical
networks not yet invented, let alone deployed, vests faith in deregulation's
ability to force technological change. Corrosive assaults on incumbency
often lead to a remarkable "flowering of innovation." 341
(tracing the theoretical underpinnings of contemporary takings doctrine to Legal
Realism).
334 See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Institutions and Long Term Planning: Lessons
from the California Electricity Crisis, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 95 (2003); Timothy P. Duane,
Regulation's Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG.
471 (2002); Paul L. Joskow, California's Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REv. ECON.
POL'Y 365, 374 (2001); Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to
Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of
Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1768 (2002).
335 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 451, 479 (2005).
336 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment
Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1719 (1995).
337 Thomas W. Hazlett, Predation in Local Cable TV Markets, 40 ANTITRUST BULL.
609, 643 (1995).
338 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000); accord, e.g., Time Warner Entertainment Co., 8
F.C.C.R. 7106, 7107-08 (1993).
339 47 U.S.C. § 257(b) (2000).
340 Act of Feb. 8, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (preamble) (1996).
341 United States v. W. Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated as moot,
84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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To the extent that deregulation is intended to restructure an industry
whose monopolistic structure is vulnerable to improved technology, the
ECPR is a singularly inappropriate regime. The ECPR's definition of
"market-based" pricing erroneously assumes that transactions in
telecommunications occurred under something resembling competitive
conditions. 342 TELRIC does consciously funnel subsidies toward entrants at
the expense of incumbent carriers. Incensed by TELRIC and other efforts to
spur competitive entry, incumbent carriers routinely decry the extension of
subsidies to their competitors as "artificial competition." 343 The trouble with
condemning procompetitive subsidies as "artificial," however, is that
incumbent telephone companies are themselves beneficiaries of regulatory
subsidies. Incumbent carriers cannot claim "natural" status when all
competitors are necessarily "artificial." In any market where the incumbent
has historically depended on public largesse, the decision to subsidize a
competitor is no more "artificial" than the incumbent's dominance is
"natural."
Given wireline telephony's historic dependence on direct and intangible
subsidies, it is downright unseemly for incumbents to argue that they should
"get all that the Government gives and do nothing that the Government
asks."344 A refusal to credit this sort of self-dealing carries no constitutional
consequences. "It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to
regulate that which it subsidizes." 345 Further attacks on TELRIC in
particular and the mandatory access strategy in general should be countered
by an explicit accounting of the many ways in which the government has
affirmatively subsidized incumbent carriers. 346
In the end, we can leave the relative merits of these pricing rules for
another day. What matters for the moment is the constitutional status of the
so-called "regulatory compact." References to such a "compact" and to its
breach as a "deregulatory taking[]" exploit "the rhetoric of legal
entitlement," the superficially lawful basis by which owners of legacy
infrastructure may "invoke the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause of
the United States Constitution as a basis for enforcing purported regulatory
342 Cf Oz SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDuSTRIES 5-6 (2001) (asserting that
network industries "cannot function as competitive markets").
343 See Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony and the Public Interest, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 307, 345 & n.236 (2003) (citing sources).
344 Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942).
345 Id. at 131.




commitments." 347 But no such legal basis exists. "To date, not a single court
has accepted the deregulatory taking[s] argument .. ,,348 The law simply
does not support any effort to transform the ECPR into a constitutional floor
on prices received by legacy networks subject to mandatory access.
"Geology knows no such word as forever." 349 Neither does law. The day
may come when regulators will insist that prices for network elements sold
under legal compulsion should include the opportunity cost of business
foreclosed by regulatory change. Given the "dynamic choice of uses ... in
light of rapid technological change," rapid turnover in substantive regulatory
policies and the procedural framework for crafting those policies may be
salutary.350 The fact remains, however, that the FCC has rejected a pro-
incumbent alternative to TELRIC, and the Supreme Court has exhibited no
inclination to adopt the ECPR as a constitutional imperative. Forlorn, the
backward-looking advocates of the "deregulatory takings" model sing of
"old, unhappy, far-off things, / And battles long ago." 351 The legal
endorsement of TELRIC's forward-looking methodology as a matter of
regulatory prerogative effectively directs incumbents to bear all "natural
sorrow, loss, or pain, / That has been, and may be again." 352
II. THE ART OF THE COVENANT: RECONSIDERING AND REJECTING THE
REGULATORY COMPACT
The futile effort to constitutionalize any ratemaking rule, let alone a
backward-looking methodology that repudiates decades of regulatory
wisdom, runs into the teeth of Supreme Court doctrine. "It is not theory but
the impact of the rate order which counts," said Hope Natural Gas.35 3 "If the
total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unreasonable, judicial
inquiry ... is at an end."' 354 As the reign of Smyth v. Ames neared its end, the
347 ROSSI, supra note 68, at 103. See generally D. N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC
OF ECONOMICS 54-86 (1985) (describing how economics is more of a persuasive art than
a quantitative discipline).
348 RossI, supra note 68, at 124.
349 WALLACE STEGNER, MORMON COUNTRY 48 (U. Neb. Press 1970) (1942).
350 Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289,
301 (2005).
351 WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, The Solitary Reaper, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL
WORKS OF WILLIAM WORDSWORTH 192 (London, Macmillan 1905); accord Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979).
352 WORDSWORTH, supra note 35 1, at 192.
353 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
354 Id.
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Supreme Court, "mindful of its distinctive function in the enforcement of
constitutional rights, ... refused to be bound by any artificial rule or formula
which changed conditions might upset. '355 Hope Natural Gas wove this
deferential attitude into the fabric of American constitutional law. Even
under the most aggressive application of Smyth's judicial approach, the sole
question before a court is whether ratemaking "has passed beyond the lowest
limit of the permitted zone of reasonableness into the forbidden reaches of
confiscation. '356 Such "judicial scrutiny" as is constitutionally warranted
must "take into account the entire legislative process, including the
reasoning and findings upon which the legislative action rests. '357
Ratemaking is precisely the sort of subtle and complex enterprise that
defies judicial review. Under the decisional sequence connecting Hope
Natural Gas to Verizon, judicial constraints on ratemaking generally yield in
favor of rules supplied by superior institutions. Courts should not reverse
administrative lawmaking concerning issues as "technical, complex, and
dynamic" as the regulation of network infrastructure. 358 Unless a legislature
prescribes a binding methodology, 359 discretion over ratemaking belongs to
the duly authorized agency.360 The "advocates of [the] deregulatory takings"
movement characterize the role of the courts as that of "enforcers of rights
and contractual bargains."'361 The metaphorical "[u]nderstanding [of]
regulation as a bargain, however, does not commit or limit courts to the role
of discovering and enforcing implicit contracts. ' 362 Indeed, the task of
"sustain[ing] preexisting bargains between firms and the government"
inherently contradicts "the longstanding tradition of judicial deference to
regulatory bodies." 363
355 L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R.R. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287, 305 (1933); accord
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 524-25 (2002).
356 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53 (1936).
357 Id.; see also id. at 50 ("The fixing of rates is a legislative act.").
358 National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 339
(2002); accord National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, Inc. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125
S. Ct. 2688, 2712 (2005).
359 See Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810, 826 (1983);
Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581, 589 (1945).
360 See Greeting Card Publishers, 462 U.S. at 825-26; Am. Commercial Lines, Inc.
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571, 590-93 (1968); Colo. Interstate, 324
U.S. at 589.
361 Jim Rossi, Moving Public Law Out of the Deference Trap in Regulated
Industries, 40 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 617, 619 (2005).
362 Rossi, supra note 68, at 95.
363 Rossi, supra note 361, at 619.
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The progressive preference for expert decisionmaking should be even
more pronounced in the context of ratemaking. 364 "Detailed judicial review
of ratemaking," far from effectively "constraining the political process,"
actually "impose[s] high error costs and high judicial resource costs." 365
Constitutionalizing any ratemaking rule, from TELRIC to the ECPR, would
"make a fetish of mere accounting" and "shield from examination the deeper
causes, forces, movements, and conditions which should govern rates."
366
Humans understandably crave certainty and order, especially causally
coherent stories that ascribe bad outcomes to prior misconduct.367 But this
yearning for predictability, especially if synthesized by force of law, carries
a deep price. As Justice Jackson recognized in his Hope Natural Gas dissent,
''our quest for certitude is so ardent that we pay an irrational reverence to a
technique which uses symbols of certainty, even though experience again
and again warns us that they are delusive." 3
68
There is an antidote to acontextual theorizing run amok. In the law of
regulated industries, as in any other field, "pedestrian 'normal science,'
pursued persistently enough, will eventually eclipse "brilliant, 'paradigm
shifting"' misadventures. 369 Faithful to takings doctrine's preference for the
"exercise of [nuanced] judgment" over "abstract" efforts at "the application
of logic," 370 this Article now undertakes the project of thoroughly sifting the
"stubborn facts" that comprise the law of regulated industries.371
A pragmatic and detail-oriented look at regulation yields two
conclusions as simple as they are sobering. First, the "regulatory compact" is
a misleading metaphor whose time has passed. At one time a descriptively
accurate and perhaps prescriptively desirable framework by which the
364 See generally Eric R. Claeys, Progressive Political Theory and Separation of
Powers on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 405 (2004).
365 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary
Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 2031, 2046 (1989).
366 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 643 n.40 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
367 See Michael J. Lemer & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution
Process: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, 85 PSYCH. BULL. 1030 (1978).
368 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 643 n.40 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
369 Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917, 929
(1986); see also KUHN, supra note 43, at 10 (defining "normal science" as "research
firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some
particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for
its further practice").
370 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
371 Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581, 605 (1945).
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government calibrated its relationship with private providers of
infrastructure, the notion of a regulatory compact has outlived its usefulness.
Indeed, it is an affirmative drag on legal understanding. It deserves to be
discarded altogether. Second, the progressive tradition in the law of
regulated industries has persisted and should be paramount. Complex and
rapidly evolving networks such as those that deliver electricity and
telecommunications demand technical expertise and administrative
flexibility beyond judicial competence.
A. The Rise and Fall of the Public Franchise
Privately owned infrastructure firms do stand in a special relationship
with regulators. At times, traditional public utility law has seen fit to
characterize this relationship as some sort of regulatory "contract" or
"compact." No other metaphor more aptly describe the project of Professors
Sidak, Spulber, and Yoo to constitutionalize ratemaking, as though strict
adherence to the ECPR were one of the conditions under which operators of
legacy transportation, energy, and communications networks submitted to
regulation of their rates and their relationships with customers and
competitors. True understanding of the "regulatory compact," however,
cannot come through grand constitutional theory. The key to the relationship
between utility shareholders and expert regulators lies exclusively in a
contextual examination of concrete regulatory policies.
Defining public utility law according to a single contractual metaphor is
historically inaccurate and jurisprudentially misleading. American
governments, particularly at the state and local levels, have always enjoyed
the alternative of directly contracting with private providers of
infrastructure. Indeed, given the traditional American disdain for public
enterprise, the contracting option was historically the first resort, not the last,
for financing infrastructure commonly designated today as "public utilities."
This is the true sense in which the "regulatory compact" might have been-
and at one time was-a legally enforceable contract.
But direct contracting between private providers of infrastructure and the
government has never taken hold in the United States for the most complex
forms of network infrastructure, especially electricity and
telecommunications. These industries hold the greatest potential for rapid
technological evolution and intermodal competition. In place of public
enterprise and direct contracting, American governments, at every level,
have historically adopted some variation on the theme of discretionary
regulation by a duly authorized, specially trained agency.
Admittedly, one of the historically dominant approaches to public utility
regulation did adopt the "regulatory compact" as a metaphor guiding judicial
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decisionmaking. This understanding of the "regulatory compact" was akin to
a substantive canon of construction guiding the interpretation of regulatory
statutes as vague as their subjects were sprawling and complex. 372 The
regulatory compact's failure as law and as policy, however, warrants a
contrary approach. In place of the outdated and socially destructive
"regulatory compact," the law of regulated industries should embrace
forward-looking, competitively neutral, and administratively workable
principles of aggressive reform.
Direct governmental ownership of infrastructure is certainly a plausible
exercise of the states' police powers. In some ways it is even legally
privileged. Generally speaking, states and their subdivisions may operate
businesses, even in an overtly biased fashion favoring their own citizens,
without fear of constitutional prohibitions on discriminatory taxation or
regulation.373 The Supreme Court grants no such latitude, however, when
state and local governments grant one private party exclusivity over a
geographic market, even when this expedient provides the most politically
viable "financing measure" for infrastructure. 374 Direct franchising with
private providers thus exposes state and local governments to some risk of
the constitutional condemnation that awaits all other measures that "hoard a
local resource ... for the benefit of local businesses." 375 This distinction
reflects a sound understanding of public choice theory. 376 Because any
372 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593
(1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26 (1994).
373 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807-09 (1976). Compare, e.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (stating that "[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul" of the dormant commerce clause) with, e.g., City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (establishing a "virtually per se rule of invalidity"
for facially discriminatory regulatory legislation). See generally Jim Chen, The Vertical
Dimension of Cooperative Competition Policy, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 1005 (2003); Jim
Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1764 (2004).
374 C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994); cf Susan
P. Schoettle & David G. Richardson, Nontraditional Uses of the Utility Concept to Fund
Public Facilities, 25 URB. LAW. 519, 523-24 (1993) (describing exclusive franchising
coupled with ratemaking as an alternative to less politically viable means of public
finance).
375 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392.
376 See generally Maxwell L. Steams, A Beautiful Mend. A Game Theoretical
Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2003).
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deployment of a state's own limited funds is transparent and can be
countered through ordinary politics, courts are more willing to tolerate
discrimination through. subsidy or direct market participation than
discrimination via coercive taxation or regulation.377
The Supreme Court readily imputes unlawful purposes to an
arrangement that straddles the line between permissible public enterprise and
unconstitutionally discriminatory franchising: "There are sound reasons for
distinguishing between a State's preferring its own residents in the initial
disposition of goods when it is a market participant and a State's attachment
of restrictions on dispositions subsequent to the goods coming to rest in
private hands. '378 Those downstream conditions enjoy no constitutional
immunity. This admittedly obscure application of the dormant commerce
clause is consistent with this area's overarching structure: state and local
governments enjoy significantly more room to experiment with outright
public ownership than with franchising.
Yet public enterprise has never taken deep root in America. Except with
respect to roads, highways, municipal transit, airports, the postal network,
and water management facilities (whether for irrigation, hydropower
generation, or municipal distribution), the United States has traditionally
eschewed direct public ownership of infrastructure. 379 Within a culture
whose citizens disdain socialism with "remarkable" intensity and are
"energetic and articulate defenders" of capitalism, 380 public ownership
represents a significant deviation from the norm of private enterprise. 381
377 See Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 479 (1989); Walter Hellerstein &
Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 840 (1996); Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a
Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 103 (1988); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish
State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1138 (1988); Michael Wells & Walter
Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1073, 1129, 1131-33 (1980).
378 South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98 (1984) (plurality
opinion).
379 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 181-83 (1982).
3 8 0 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE ART OF CONTROVERSY 35
(1955).
381 See, e.g., E.J. Mishan, Criteria for Public Investment: Some Simplifying
Suggestions, 75 J. POL. ECON. 139 (1967); John E. Osbom, New York's Urban
Development Corporation: A Study on the Unchecked Power of a Public Authority, 43
BROOK. L. REV. 237, 238 (1977); William J. Quirk & Leon E. Wein, A Short




Aside from public agencies such as the Bonneville Power Administration 382
and the Tennessee Valley Authority, 383 most facilities for the generation,
transmission, or distribution of electricity in the United States remain in
private hands. By contrast, economic regulation short of expropriation is
pervasive. On a broader historic and geographic scale, both of these
tendencies are anomalies. Non-American jurisdictions are much more likely
to treat the deployment of infrastructure as a job for the government. Rien de
grand ne sefait sans l 'Etat.384
The contemporary law of regulated industries, however, did not spring,
Athena-like, directly from the legislative imagination of the late nineteenth
century. At that time, municipal franchising of private firms represented the
dominant means of supplying water and gas. 385 The decline of these so-
called "concession contracts" coincided with the emergence of urban
streetcar and electricity networks. 386 By the eve of World War I, most
franchises had yielded either to outright municipal ownership or to
regulation by newly established public utility commissions. 387 Like the brief
period during which competing carriers enabled nearly half of American
cities to choose among multiple telephone carriers, 388 concession contracting
before the Great War offered fleeting hope that infrastructure required
neither monopolistic dominance nor intensive regulation.
The franchising movement collapsed amid charges that "cities were too
incompetent or corrupt to regulate,"389 notwithstanding its advocates' belief
that municipal franchising has performed at least as well as utility regulation
in limiting rates and improving service. 390 "[M]any if not most state and
local utility regulators shifted from a franchise model to ongoing and ad hoc
rate of return regulation during the twentieth century."'391 The economics of
382 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 832-832m (2000).
383 See id. §§ 831-83lee.
384 Charles Pasqua, L 'heure de vgritg, ANTENNE 2 (Feb. 1990) ("Nothing big gets
done without the government.").
385 See G6MEZ-IBAREZ, supra note 2, at 157-66.
386 See id. at 166-76.
387 See id at 176-78.
388 See Warren G. Lavey, The Public Policies That Changed the Telephone Industry
into Regulated Monopolies: Lessons from Around 1915, 39 FED. COMM. L.J. 171, 178
(1987); Howard A. Shelanski, From Sector-Specific Regulation to Antitrust Law for US
Telecommunications: The Prospects for Transition, 26 TELECOM. POL'Y 335, 343-44
(2002).
389 GOMEZ-IBA&FEZ, supra note 2, at 174.
390 See id at 182-83.
391 Claeys, supra note 25, at 236. See generally CHARLEs H. KENNEDY, AN
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the firm dictated this trend. As if to rebuke judicial pronouncements that
governments "simply are different from private parties and have a different
role to play" in a regulatory system,392 increasingly sophisticated
connections are emerging between the economics of the firm and economic
constraints on public governance. 393 Most conventional "descriptions of
natural monopoly stress the importance of large economies of scale and
underplay the role of durable and immobile investments in establishing the
barrier to entry."' 394 To be sure, the construction of infrastructure does often
yield some sort of monopoly, either because the type of infrastructure at
issue truly does lend itself to "natural monopoly" or because monopoly
persists by inertia from earlier decisions to regulate entry, exit, rates, and
terms of service.395 But economies of scale, economies of scope, and
network efficiencies "are arguably less important than durable and immobile
investments in establishing the barrier to entry in natural monopoly." 396 At
an extreme, the presence of "durable and immobile investments, not
economies of scale, [is arguably] the defining characteristic of infrastructure
monopolies." 397
The law of regulated industries thus represents nothing less than an
extension of the mission that Ronald Coase outlined in The Nature of the
Firm-the task of rendering "[tihe whole of the 'structure of competitive
industry' ... tractable by the ordinary technique of economic analysis." 398
Within regulatory policy, The Nature of the Firm has much greater impact
INTRODUCTION To U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 5-17 (1994); Priest, supra note 318,
at 301-23.
392 Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 290
(1986).
393 See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking
Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595 (2000); Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. &
Howard McCurdy, The End of Market Failure, 23:2 REGULATION 10 (2001); Richard 0.
Zerbe, Jr. & Howard E. McCurdy, The Failure of Market Failure, 18 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 558 (1999). "[T]he whole federalist institutional structure of the state might
[have been] formed to minimize the transaction costs of making collective decisions."
DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 73 & n. 13 (1989); cf Gordon Tullock, Federalism:
Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1969).
394 G6MEz-IBAf-EZ, supra note 2, at 8; see also Richard Schmalensee, A Note on
Economies of Scale and Natural Monopoly in the Distribution of Public Utility Services,
9 BELL J. ECON. 270 (1978).
395 See generally Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21
STAN. L. REv. 548, 611-16 (1969).
396 G6MEz-IBAf4Ez, supra note 2, at 9.
397 Id. (emphasis in original).
398 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 398 (1937).
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than The Problem of Social Cost.3 99 Notwithstanding the theory of
"deregulatory takings" as propounded by Professors Sidak, Spulber, and
Yoo, the Coase Theorem's strong emphasis on property rights40 0 has little
bearing on regulated industries. "[A]mbiguous property rights are not a
major source of high transaction costs" affecting the "case for government
intervention in infrastructure monopolies. 401
By contrast, The Nature of the Firm revealed that vertical integration
within one firm and open-market purchases reflect the same economic
calculus. Any entrepreneur must decide whether to secure "factors of
production at a lower price than the market transactions" superseded by
vertical integration, or else "to revert to the open market" to acquire those
same factors of production from other suppliers. 40 2 In other words, "market
transactions" occur-at the expense of efforts to integrate "all production"
into "one big firm"-because intrafirm management cannot invariably
"reduce the cost of production," let alone wholly "eliminate certain
[categories of] costs. '403 The Nature of the Firm's most important
conclusion-that firms arise to minimize transaction costs in
production 4°4-governs any organizational undertaking, whether for profit
or for political power.
A Coasean analysis suggests that the most substantial problems in the
regulation of infrastructure involve asset-specificity and the difficulty of
facilitating interoperability without sacrificing competition. Workable
solutions must overcome daunting barriers such as the impossibility of
anticipating all legal or technological changes and the intractability of
coordinating the use of any single transportation or communications
platform. Just as The Problem of Social Cost informed Guido Calabresi and
399 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Legal writers'
preference for The Problem of Social Cost over The Nature of the Firm, the true source
of transaction cost analysis, is nevertheless striking. Only two federal courts have ever
cited The Nature of the Firm. See Herzog Contracting Corp. v. McGowen Corp., 976
F.2d 1062, 1067 (7th Cir. 1992); Clajon Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 197, 215-16
(2002) (Beghe, J., dissenting). By contrast, dozens of courts have cited The Problem of
Social Cost. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 864 n.3
(1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Tavemor v. Ill. Fed'n of Teachers, 226 F.3d 842, 849 (7th Cir. 2000).
400 See Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained. The Ironic History of
the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REv. 397, 397 (1997) (tracing the derivation of the Coase
Theorem from The Problem of Social Cost).
401 G6MEZ-I1BaAEZ, supra note 2, at 22.
402 Coase, supra note 398, at 392.
403 Id. at 394.
404 See id. at 392.
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Douglas Melamed's choice between property rules and liability rules, 405 The
Nature of the Firm informs the choice between utility regulation and
contractual alternatives. Negotiation is never free of cost, and the inability of
parties to foresee all contingencies means that contracts are unavoidably
incomplete. 406 Whether government elects to build infrastructure on its own,
to contract with private firms for infrastructure, or to retain long-term
oversight over a shareholder-owned utility depends on contractual cost and
contractual incompleteness. Each of these factors, along with the towering
significance of information in the modern economy, favors a high degree of
vertical integration to the extent that a single firm can outperform
uncoordinated actors in internalizing and reducing the costs of
contracting. 407
Asset-specificity is formally defined as the relative difficulty of
transferring assets intended for use in one transaction to other uses.408
Whether limited by geography, time, or human capital, highly specific assets
are sunk costs whose value is constrained beyond a specific transaction.
Holders of highly specific assets need strong contractual reassurances to
combat opportunism by nimbler rivals or business partners. No matter which
party bears its brunt, the problem of asset-specificity is "an inevitable
consequence of . .. technology" and of physical constraints on large,
immobile, and durable investments.409 Moreover, the very presence of
specialization, so essential to the construction and operation of large-scale
infrastructure, exacerbates asset-specificity and magnifies the potential for
405 See Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972); cf James
E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 440 (1995).
406 See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1988); Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of
the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EvoLuTIoN, AND DEVELOPMENT 138,
140-42 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991).
407 See generally MARK CASSON, INFORMATION AND ORGANIZATION: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRM (1997).
408 See generally, e.g., OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1996); Paul L. Joskow, Asset
Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 95 (1988); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983); Oliver E. Williamson, The
Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOCIOL. 548
(1981).




Opportunistic exploitation of a party who has committed asset-specific
resources poses a serious threat in any contractual setting. 411 Most accounts
of regulatory failure emphasize private vulnerability to governmental
treachery-the prospect "that the government will renege on commitments to
private infrastructure rather than vice versa. '412 This is almost certainly the
threat of opportunistic breach that animates Professors Sidak, Spulber, and
Yoo's appeal to a mythical "regulatory compact." The libertarian tradition in
property law counsels that regulatory policy in general and takings doctrine
in particular should err in favor of compensating incumbents and
"encouraging long-term investment," insofar as "telecommunications [and]
other utilities" are prone to the "strong danger that regulators may
discourage long-term utility investment by using the power to regulate to
expropriate capital. '413
The libertarian narrative, however, neglects the prospect that private
firms can themselves behave opportunistically. "[G]overnment and
consumer vulnerability to opportunism" by privately owned utilities is at
least as plausible as expropriation. 414 As a state supreme court recognized in
a recent ratemaking dispute, grave danger lies in regulatory rules that allow a
utility to "earn[] a profit when things [go] well," but "turn around and force
ratepayers to reimburse" shareholders for "great losses" that the utility might
incur.415 Whatever else regulation should be, it cannot represent a game of
"heads I win, tails you lose." It also bears remembering that asset-specificity
is unique to utility companies. By making their own durable, immobile
investments based on privately supplied infrastructure, consumers can
become "captive" in their own right. An incumbent firm's market power is
often potent enough to deter potential challengers. Whether achieved
through contract, utility regulation, or public enterprise, the provision of
infrastructure must anticipate all potential changes affecting the three-way
410See Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297, 298-300 (1978).
411 See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPrrALISM, supra note
408, at 76; Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 352 (1991).
412 GOMEZ-IBAifEZ, supra note 2, at 2.
413 Claeys, supra note 25, at 208. See generally Eric R. Claeys, Takings,
Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1549, 1607-15 (2003)
(outlining a libertarian theory of property).
414 G6MEZ-IBAIREZ, supra note 2, at 3.
415 PacifiCorp v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 103 P.3d 862, 874 (Wyo. 2004) (describing
recovery under such circumstances as "set[ting] a poor precedent").
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relationship between the firm, the market, and the regulatory state.416
As was true during the heyday of the municipal franchise, a very
tangible "regulatory compact" may bind government with private providers
of infrastructure. Nearly forty years ago, Harold Demsetz asked outright,
"Why regulate public utilities? ''417 A budding movement to revive the
municipal franchise in place of public utility regulation has taken its
inspiration from Demsetz and other experts who "were critical of the
performance of U.S. regulatory agencies, and [who] saw a return to
concession contracts as the answer." 418 So-called Demsetz competition
posits that government can emulate competition even under monopolistic
conditions "by competitively awarding a concession of limited duration to
the bidder who offer[s] the lowest prices and best service." 419
Demsetz competition, however, has fallen far short of displacing more
elaborate forms of regulation. "[E]ven carefully drawn contracts are unlikely
to anticipate every contingency, especially if uncertainty is great or the
duration of the contract is long."420 The increased "need for contractual
complexity" simultaneously raises "the cost of bilateral contracting" and
enhances the allure of "internal control."'421 Municipal franchising has not
displaced the state and "federal regulatory agencies for most of the
established regulated industries." 422 Most pointedly, "municipal officials are
not trying to draft twenty- or thirty-year contracts for complex integrated
utility systems," least of all for the "most complex utilities, such as
electricity and telephones." 423 These networks continue to be regulated on
the public utility model. 424 Electricity and telecommunications are the
industries whose "breadth and complexity ... demand" that regulators
4 16 See generally RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988).
417 Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
418 G6MEZ-IBAf EZ, supra note 2, at 85; see also, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The
Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. EcoN. 98,
126 (1972); Mark A. Zupan, The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of
Cable Television: Some Systemic Evidence, 32 J.L. & EcoN. 401, 404-07 (1989).
419 G6MEZ-IBAREZ, supra note 2, at 85.
420Id. at 85-86; see also Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered
Contracts, 7 BELL J. EcON. 426, 426 (1976); Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding
for Natural Monopolies-In General and with Respect to CA TV, 7 BELL J. EcON. 73, 75
(1976).
421 ROSS,, supra note 68, at 38. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996).
422 G6MEZ-IB.AEZ, supra note 2, at 86.




charged with patrolling them "be given every reasonable opportunity to
formulate methods of regulation appropriate for the solution of... intensely
practical difficulties." 425 The federal agencies duly empowered to regulate
those markets enjoy expansive statutory mandates with "public interest"
provisions that are as "supple" and "as concrete as the complicated factors
for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit. '426 FERC and the
FCC have rarely hesitated to exploit their "wide discretion" to engage in
"imaginative interpretation" of the Federal Power Act of 1935, the Natural
Gas Act of 1938, and the Communications Act of 1934.427
Direct contracting fails-and ad hoc public utility regulation persists-
because municipal franchising suffers from excessive transaction costs and
imperfect information gathering. Local government occupies too small a
footprint to gather the information for accurate long-term projections
regarding demand for infrastructure and its durability vis-A-vis future
technological developments. Aside from fostering experimentation with
diverse regulatory arrangements, federalism in general and "home rule" in
particular do little to advance regulatory reform. Devolution is particularly
ineffective in markets "whose economies of scale, economies of scope, or
dependence on technological innovation defies the regulatory reach of any
geographically delimited jurisdiction." 428 Excessive decentralization may
even be affirmatively debilitating in markets characterized by functional
convergence, interoperability, and network efficiencies. 429
An appeals court decision that otherwise "raises no central issues of
telecommunications policy" illustrates this point.430 In 2004 the D.C. Circuit
barred the FCC from delegating to the states the responsibility of
determining whether an ILEC's "failure to provide access to [certain]
network elements would impair the ability" of a competitive carrier "to
provide the services that it seeks to offer."431 The resulting bar to
425 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1968); accord Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501-02 (2002).
426 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
427 FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953).
428 Chen, supra note 343, at 310-11; cf Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency,
the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-
Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1248 (1995) (arguing that the "stringent clear-
articulation policy" of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978), effectively federalizes Dillon's rule of local government law, much to the chagrin
of the "'home rule' movement").
429 See Chen, supra note 343, at 311.
430 Epstein, supra note 302, at 343.
431 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2)(B) (2000); see U.S. Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d
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downstream delegation effectively curbs state regulators, the probable
"source of most of the anticompetitive restraints remaining in the American
economy." 432
Long-term contracting for infrastructure cannot address the most
important needs of sophisticated electricity and telecommunications
networks. Greater static complexity and greater dynamic variation in the
already uncertain path of technological evolution demand greater flexibility.
Complex subject matter, asymmetrical information, high monitoring costs,
and political uncertainty exacerbate the cost and complexity of ordinary
contracting. 433 These conditions drive the project of financing infrastructure
away from direct contracting and toward a supple regulatory framework
within which government may more freely renegotiate the terms by which
private providers supply durable infrastructure.
B. The Persistence of the Public Utility Model
For the time being, American law is unlikely to supplant its existing
complex of regulatory arrangements with a pervasive system of contracts
connecting governments with private providers of infrastructure. Instead, the
American understanding of infrastructure policy can be traced to either of
the two great statutory charters of federal economic regulation, the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887434 or the Sherman Act of 1890.43 5 These statutes
outlined "two related but distinct legal strategies for correcting the perceived
defects of capitalistic competition. '436 Absent a congressional determination
to the contrary, the presence of "a detailed regulatory scheme such as that
created by the [Telecommunications] Act ordinarily raises the question
whether the regulated entities are not shielded from antitrust scrutiny
altogether." 437
Federal regulation of surface transportation, at least in its original
554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
432 Gifford, supra note 428, at 1254.
433 See Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and
Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 104-06
(2000).
434 Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
435 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
436 Jim Chen, Regulatory Education and Its Reform, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 145, 149
(1999).
437 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 406 (2004); see, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422
U.S. 694 (1975); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
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incarnation, provided the model for command-and-control regulation of
specific industries.438 Remarkable as it seems today, the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) supervised telephone rates for nearly a
quarter century.439 The law that displaced the ICC from telecommunications,
the epochal Communications Law of 1934,440 still provides the basic
statutory framework for all wired and wireless carriers and broadcasters. The
regulatory provisions of the Federal Power Act date from 1935 44 1 and
remain largely intact despite the obsolescence of the constitutional
distinction that inspired the original legislation442 and despite two
comprehensive overhauls in 197844 3 and 1992. 4" By contrast, federal
antitrust law exhibits a far stronger faith in robust competition and its
virtues. Private enforcement 445 and an evolutive, "common law" approach to
statutory interpretation 44 6 are hallmarks of contract-based competition under
438 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 44, at 1325 ("The original [regulatory]
paradigm was established over 100 years ago with the enactment in 1887 of the Interstate
Commerce Act.").
439 See Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve
Bros., 256 U.S. 566, 573 (1921); Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 610 F.2d 1114, 1118 (3d Cir. 1979). See generally Dean Burch, Common Carrier
Communications by Wire and Radio: A Retrospective, 37 FED. CoMM. L.J. 85, 87 (1985);
Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 835, 838-39 (1997); Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications
Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 3, 8 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
440 Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
441 See Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (1935). The original Federal Power
Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), authorized the licensing of hydropower plants. See
generally United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 423-24 (1940).
442 See Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90
(1927) (holding that wholesale transactions in electricity could not be regulated by either
the originating or the terminating state); cf New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 16-17, 23-
24 (2002) (recognizing Attleboro's inapplicability to an electricity market lacking crisp
boundaries between intrastate and interstate transactions).
443 See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(1978).
444 See Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
445 See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (providing treble damage suits for "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws..."); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (requiring that a Clayton Act plaintiff suffer "antitrust injury"); I11. Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977) (barring an indirect purchaser from recovering
antitrust damages).
446 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997); Spectrum Sports, Inc.
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America's "Magna Carta of free enterprise." 447 The differences between
public utility and antitrust law should not be overstated. Great regulatory
charters, such as the Communications Act, the Natural Gas Act, and the
Federal Power Act, also authorize regulatory agencies and "the federal
courts to develop ... basic principles" from these statutes' "common law-
like" provisions.448 Both antitrust and its public utility counterpart empower
enforcement agents to give contextual meaning to these statutes' "majestic
generalities."449
This is the sense in which conventional public utility law may be
understood as establishing some kind of "regulatory compact." Regulation
establishes an incomplete, long-term contractual relationship that offers
utilities a fair rate of return under terms that enable utilities and the
government alike to renegotiate the terms and conditions of service at
relatively low cost.450 Public utility regulation represents "a compact of
sorts"--an implicit albeit legally unenforceable promise by government to
ensure utility shareholders "a level of stability in earnings and value" in
exchange for "universal, non-discriminatory service and protection from
monopolistic profits."'451 The Wyoming Supreme Court has succinctly
described the terms of this symbolic arrangement:
v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454 (1993); Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, "Is
There a Text in this Class?" The Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 624 (2005).
447 See, e.g., At. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 n.19
(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40, 56 n.19 (1982); Ca. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
448 Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 41, 51 (2003).
449 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947); accord Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966).
450 See WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 408,
at 347.
451 Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Starr, J., concurring) (emphasis added); accord Transmission Access Policy Study
Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2000), affirmed in part sub nom. New
York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002); see also WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM, supra note 408, at 347; cf Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve"
and Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility
Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1242-43 (1998) (describing the putative
regulatory contract as the transformation of "an ancient common law duty" into a
statutory "duty to serve" under contemporary public utility law).
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The "regulatory compact" provides the fundamental basis for utility
regulation. In general, the compact is a theoretical agreement between the
utilities and the state in which, as a quid pro quo for being granted a
monopoly in a geographical area for the provision of a particular good or
service, the utility is subject to regulation by the state to ensure that it is
prudently investing its revenues in order to provide the best and most
efficient service possible to the consumer. In exchange, the utility is allowed
to earn a fair rate of return on its rate base.4 52
Although the regulatory compact is not directly enforceable, it does have
some impact on the interpretation and implementation of specific doctrines
within the discretionary framework of public utility law. Of all the implicit
promises made to the regulated firm under the metaphorical "regulatory
compact," none is so strong as the tacit pledge to shelter incumbent utilities
from financially corrosive entry. When contemplating competitive petitions
to serve a market already occupied by an incumbent, regulators pledge not to
act solely on the basis of some pro-competitive economic theory, but rather
to engage in a thorough examination of the factual context before granting a
competitive petition. "Merely to assume that competition is bound to be of
advantage, in an industry so regulated and so largely closed as is this one, is
not enough. '453 Or as a federal court has said more recently, "mere
invocation of theory is an insufficient substitute for substantial evidence and
reasoned explanations." 4 54
The so-called regulatory compact is the product of a repeated dynamic
game in which the principal objective of a private provider of infrastructure
452 PacifiCorp v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 103 P.3d 862, 871 (Wyo. 2004) (emphasis
added). Similar formulations are found throughout other federal and state cases. See, e.g.,
Transmission Access Policy Study Group, 225 F.3d at 700; Allegheny Energy v. DQE,
Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 482, 486 (W.D. Pa. 1999); Hartwell Corp. v. Super. Ct., 27 Cal. 4th
256, 282 (2002); U.S. Gypsum, Inc. v. Ind. Gas Co., 735 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Ind. 2000);
Ind. Gas Co., v. Office of Util. Consumer Counselor, 575 N.E.2d 1044, 1046 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991); City of Toledo v. Toledo Edison Co., 770 N.E.2d 132, 137 (Ohio Ct. Com.
P1. 2000). Though Wyoming's PacifCorp formulation of the regulatory compact
emphasizes rate regulation, other descriptions of the compact stress the utility's universal
service obligations. See, e.g., Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 104
S.W.3d 225, 227-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) ("Under a fully regulated system, an electricity
utility enters into a 'regulatory compact' with the public: in return for a monopoly over
electricity service in a given area; the utility agrees to provide service to all requesting
customers and to charge only the retail rates set by the Commission.").
453 FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 97 (1953); accord, e.g.,
Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
454 Elec. Consumers Res. Council v. FERC, 747 F.2d 1511, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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is to curb regulators' temptation to renege on their original understanding. 455
Firms seek ways to restrict regulators' legal discretion, especially in the face
of changing economic conditions that may tempt regulators to subvert the
regulatory compact. Large swings in a utility company's profits are
especially likely to invite opportunistic behavior by regulators. Of course,
opportunism infects all parties to any contract. The state may have a
monopoly on violence, but no contractual party, public or private, is immune
from the temptation to cheat. As Richard Epstein has said of "bargaining
with the state" in the most general sense, "[b]argaining does not take place in
a vacuum." 456 To understand bargaining in the regulatory context, where one
of the parties may be the government, we must first determine the legal
frame of reference by "which government ... contracts are to be
assessed." 457
What the regulatory compact does not represent, however, is the creation
of specific, contractually enforceable rights running in favor of regulated
utilities and against the government. Under no circumstances can the
government, having chosen to engage a private partner to provide public
infrastructure, be held to have waived its right to modify its legislation. The
very existence of a body of public utility law and an expert regulatory
agency implies that the government has already forsworn the alternatives of
direct public enterprise and a concession contract with a private firm.
"[A]bsent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself
contractually," courts must presume "that 'a law is not intended to create
private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be
pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise."'' 458 To presume
otherwise would subjugate the regulatory function of government, which is
after all its primary calling, to the making of contracts.459 "The continued
existence of a government would be of no great value, if by implications and
presumptions, it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the
ends of its creation .. ,,460 Unlike contracts, regulatory laws and policies
455 See Richard J. Gilbert & David M. Newbery, The Dynamic Efficiency of
Regulatory Constitutions, 25 RAND J. EcoN. 538 (1994).
4 5 6 RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 18 (1993).
457 Id.
4 58 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S.
451, 465-66 (1985) (quoting Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)); accord,
e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ariz. Elec. Power Coop., 83 P.3d 573, 598 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2004); see also Rector of Christ Church v. County of Philadelphia, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
300, 302 (1861) ("Such an interpretation is not to be favored").
459 See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938).
460 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 548 (1837));
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"are inherently subject to revision and repeal, and to construe laws as
contracts when the obligation is not clearly and unequivocally expressed
would be to limit drastically the essential powers of a legislative body."
461
Even the most generous Supreme Court decision on public contracting
would not cripple the government in such a debilitating fashion. The 1996
case of United States v. Winstar Corp.462 held the federal government
responsible for violating an express agreement "to indemnify its contracting
partners against financial losses arising from regulatory change."
463 Without
reaching a precise legal rationale, a majority of Justices concluded that
Congress had breached the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's promise of
favorable accounting treatment for certain savings and loan institutions.
464
By contrast, neither telecommunications nor any other industry regulated as
a public utility has proceeded under such a contract.465  The
Telecommunications Act represents general legislation "designed to spread
the costs of a societal problem"--namely, reconciling the discipline of
monopoly in infrastructure markets with the preservation of universal access
to infrastructure services-rather than a contractual arrangement between
private firms and the government. 466 In any event, every opinion in Winstar
reaffirmed the longstanding rule against the freewheeling interpretation of
contracts purporting to effect "a conveyance or surrender of sovereign
power."467
accord Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 397 (1944).
461 Atchison, 470 U.S. at 466.
462 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
463 Id. at 887 (plurality opinion).
464 See generally Rossi, supra note 68, at 119-20; Michael Malloy, When You Wish
upon Winstar: Contract Analysis and the Future of Regulatory Action, 42 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 409, 435-36 (1998).
465 Compare Hovenkamp, supra note 233, at 821 (arguing that the law of economic
regulation has generally abandoned company-by-company charters in favor of broad
statutes authorizing an expert agency to regulate entire industries in the public interest),
with Winstar, 518 U.S. at 860-61 (plurality opinion) (acknowledging the need to identify
the existence of an agreement between private parties and the government).
466 Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569, 1576 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951 (1998).
467 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 918 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (noting the need to "underscore[] the special circumstances that [are]
required to convince [a] [c]ourt of the existence of [a] claimed promise."); id. at 921
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Governments do not ordinarily agree to curtail
their sovereign or legislative powers, and contracts must be interpreted in a commonsense
way against that background understanding."); id. at 926 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("'[A] waiver of sovereign authority will not be implied, but instead must be
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Although the law of regulated industries has undergone rapid and
extensive change, the putative "regulatory compact" should not be construed
so as to cripple the government's ability to revisit the legislative framework
by which it regulates privately supplied infrastructure. The United States'
most important regulatory charters have survived several spectacular
deregulatory episodes. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,468 the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,469 the Energy Policy Act of 1992,470
and the Telecommunications Act of 1996471 have all retained the basic
formulas-certification of entry and exit in the public interest, convenience,
and necessity, plus the regulation of just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
rates-established by the Natural Gas Act,4 72 the Federal Power Act,47 3 and
the Communications Act of 1934.4 74 The Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol
Act of 1989475 ended federal regulation of wellhead gas prices, but that
statute is more accurately regarded as an overdue restoration of the Natural
Gas Act's original exemption of the "production and gathering" of gas. 476
Not even the transfer of power from the ICC to the Surface
Transportation Board had significant impact. The ICC Termination Act of
1995477 performed the mostly "symbolic gesture 478 of abolishing the first
federal regulatory agency. 479 Statutes passed in 1976 and 1980 had already
eliminated most regulatory oversight from railroads. 480 Statutes passed in
1993 and 1994481 completed the gradual elimination of antidiscrimination
"surrendered in unmistakable terms."'") (citing United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480
U.S. 700, 707 (1987)); cf Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 180 F.3d 1124, 1142
(10th Cir. 1999) (observing that Winstar does not affect the United States' tort liability).
468 Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350.
469 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117.
470 Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776.
471 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
472 Ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938).
473 Ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (1935).
474 Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
475 Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157.
476 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 677 (1954).
477 Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803.
478 G6MEZ-BAREZ, supra note 2, at 194.
479 See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. See generally Clyde B. Aitchison,
The Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act: 1887-1937, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 289,
289-90 (1937).
480 See Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
210, 90 Stat. 31; Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895.
481 See Negotiated Rates Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-180, 107 Stat. 2044;
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and tariffing requirements in trucking, a deregulatory process traceable to the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980.482 On the eve of the ICC's abolition and the
transfer of its shriveled mandate to the "Surf Board," politicians and
commentators alike had already been thinking of carriage by rail and by
truck as deregulated enterprises for more than a decade.
483
Paradoxically, deregulation may be more legally complex than
command-and-control regulation. Simply put, freer markets demand more
rules. 484 Deregulation's first stage gathers low-hanging fruit: legislators can
subject "industries and industry segments with few natural monopoly
features" to "complete detariffing, elimination of all entry restrictions, and
outright abolition of the control of an administrative agency." 485 As
deregulation progresses, however, "the effort to substitute competition for
regulation may actually increase the complexity and importance of the
regulator's task."'486 Once the comprehensive reform of laws such as the
Federal Power Act and the Communications Act redirects the government's
"attention [toward] the fraction of [each] industry's activities that are
monopolistic," the regulatory focus shifts toward supervision of the
"complex relationships between the monopolistic and the competitive
segments of the industry. '487 This transition presents "a trade-off between
the benefits from more competition and the costs from reduced
coordination." 488
This difficulty explains the basic paradox of deregulation as an engine of
legal complexity. The Telecommunications Act in particular has drawn
sharp criticism for failing to be "a model of clarity.
4 89 
"[M]ost
Trucking Industry Regulatory Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-311, 108 Stat. 1683.
482 Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.
483 Compare H.R. REP. No. 104-311, at 90 (1995) (noting that "the railroad industry
ha[d] operated in an essentially deregulated environment" since the passage of the
Staggers Act) with FRANK J. DOOLEY & WILLIAM E. THOMs, RAILROAD LAW A DECADE
AFTER DEREGULATION (1994) (res ipsa loquitur).
4 8 4 See generally STEVEN K. VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES: REGULATORY
REFORM IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 2-5 (1996).
485 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 44, at 1363.
486 G6MEZ-IBAREZ, supra note 2, at 249.
487 Id.
488 Id.
489 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) (describing the Act's
lack of clarity as a "gross understatement"); accord, e.g., Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v.
MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., 323 F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir. 2003); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. U.S. W. Communications, 204 F.3d 1262, 1266 (9th Cir. 2000);
Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 449 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied
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unfortunate," the Supreme Court has lamented, this "piece of legislation,"
which "profoundly affects a crucial segment of the economy worth tens of
billions of dollars" appears "in many important respects" to be "a model of
ambiguity or indeed self-contradiction. '490 The Telecommunications Act
hardly even feels deregulatory: "How can an Act that says 'shall' 2,036
times be deregulatory?" 491 In other words, although public utility law has
slouched toward "deregulation" for a generation, the sheer complexity of the
task still renders it impossible to interpret the legal relationship between the
government and the regulated firm in strictly contractual terms.
In other words, deregulation transforms rather than eliminates
comprehensive governmental oversight. The old pitfalls remain. Alfred
Kahn, a living "Prophet of Regulation," 492 has documented the many ways
in which deregulation can fail as spectacularly as conventional regulation. 493
Ceteris paribus, regulation should minimize opportunities for mischief. This
approach superficially resembles what Richard Epstein has prescribed in a
different context: regulators should adopt simple rules for a complex
economy. 494
A general preference for simple rules over more complex alternatives
reflects the one lesson that utility customers have unwittingly taught
throughout deregulation: because choice can backfire, more sometimes is
less. Complete freedom of choice has encouraged retail consumers to refuse
the benefits of competition. For example, twenty years after the Bell breakup
decree,495 AT&T retains a whopping sixty percent of the retail long-distance
sub nom. Celpage, Inc. v. FCC, 530 U.S. 1210 (2000) and cert. dismissed sub nom. GTE
Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 531 U.S. 975 (2000); P.R. Tel. Co. v. Telecomms. Regulatory Bd.,
189 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 1999); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 641 (2d
Cir. 1999).
490 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 397; cf Epstein, supra note 302, at 341 (asserting
that "the language of' the Telecommunications Act "does not speak with magnificent
clarity").
491 Joseph Farrell, Creating Local Competition, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 211
(1996).
49 2 See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS
ADAMS, Louis D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 223 (1984).
493 See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, WHOM THE GODS WOULD DESTROY, OR How
NOT TO DEREGULATE (2001).
4 9 4 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 21 (1995).
495 See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (D.D.C. 1983), affd
mem. sub nom. California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983); United States v. Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-32 (D.D.C. 1982), affdmem. sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), terminated by Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 143-44 (codified as amended at 47
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market.496 Only fifteen percent of retail consumers in Philadelphia 497 and an
astonishing three percent in California switched providers after the
introduction of retail competition in electricity. 498 Regulators may be more
sophisticated than the- consumers they protect, but as with consumers,
psychological constraints limit the amount of choice that regulators can
realistically handle. Too often, overloaded regulators reflexively protect the
firms and legal structures they know best.
Simplicity alone is no guarantee of substantive correctness. The hoary
debate between the "fair value" and "prudent investment" standards for the
valuation of utility property illustrates how short-run administrability may
obstruct superior regulation in the long run. Nevertheless, even if the simpler
rule turns out to be imperfect or even wrong, the maintenance of a
streamlined legal platform enables future regulators to embrace superior
rules by minimizing the amount of legal "underbrush" that must eventually
be cleared. As with automated tools whose users no longer understand the
technological details once known to their developers, 499 legal doctrines will
eventually fall into the hands of decisionmakers who neither know nor
appreciate those doctrines' subtleties.
No system of regulation can consistently satisfy the fundamental
criterion for governmental intervention: "mov[ing] society closer to the
solution that the parties would have agreed to in a world free of transaction
costs." 500 As a seemingly hopeless quest to set rates according to
competitive conditions that do not exist and cannot emerge in the presence
of a regulatory apparatus, 501 conventional rate-of-return regulation richly
deserves its derogatory reputation as "the most speculative undertaking ...
U.S.C. § 152 note (2000)).
4 9 6 See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESS 25
(2004).
497 See id.
498 See Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 155, 174, 185-86 (2001).
4 9 9 See generally MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: HUMAN-
CENTERED COMPUTERS AND WHAT THEY CAN Do FOR US (2001); JAKOB NIELSEN,
USABILITY ENGINEERING (1994); DONALD A. NORMAN, THINGS THAT MAKE US SMART:
DEFENDING HUMAN ATrRIBUTES IN THE AGE OF THE MACHINE (1993); DONALD A.
NORMAN, THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS (1990); COST-JUSTIFYING USABILITY
(Randolph G. Bias & Deborah J. Mayhew eds., 1994); Leon E. Wein, Maladjusted
Contrivances and Clumsy Automation: A Jurisprudential Investigation, 9 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 375, 380-81 (1996).
500 G6MEz-IBA&ZEz, supra note 2, at 22.
501 See generally Posner, supra note 395, at 611-16.
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in the entire history of [Anglo-American] jurisprudence. ' 50 2 The
impossibility of attaining perfection makes ratemaking a perennial source of
judicial and administrative frustration: "Allocation of costs is not a matter
for the slide-rule. It involves judgment on a myriad of facts. It has no claim
to an exact science." 50 3 Even at its best, utility regulation "will always
[raise] ... embarrassing question[s]" of indeterminacy and inefficacy. 50 4
The law of regulated industries demands "highly complex judgments...
if legislative desires, majoritarian needs, and the demands of continuity and
change are to be met in a system that never stands still technologically or
sociologically." 50 5 This body of law requires both an expectation of
imperfection and an enduring commitment to reinvention. Those obligations
vastly exceed the capacity of that woefully obsolete legal metaphor, the
"regulatory compact."
IV. THE DEATH OF COMPACT
"Like all other questions, the question of how to promote a flourishing
society ... [should] be answered as much by experience [as by] theory." 50 6
In a legal system as stable as the United States', regulatory change, like its
glacial equivalent, is slow in coming but epochal when it happens. The
"great transformation" of the law of regulated industries has occurred in
mostly piecemeal fashion. 50 7 Without detailed legislative guidance,
administrative agencies have used their discretion to effect incremental
changes in the natural gas, electricity, and telecommunications industries.
These regulators have sharpened their wisdom through trial and error.
Constant legal change is a hallmark of what an earlier generation called
"muddling through. ' 50 8 As late as the 1980s, "[v]ertical integration between
502 West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 689 (1935) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
503 Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581, 589 (1945);
accord Nat'l Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810, 825
(1983).
504 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898); accord Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1989).
505 GuiDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 68 (1982).
506 Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331, 1347 (1988).
507 See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 44.
508 See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through, " 19 PuB. ADMIN.
REv. 79, 79 (1959); cf Kenneth C. Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L.
REv. 713, 733 (1969) (urging administrative agencies to accumulate information over
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generation and transmission" in electricity was "virtually universal. 50 9
"Fifty years from now," one scholar has speculated, "we may look back to
view private provision of infrastructure as the norm, and public provision as
a failed experiment of the mid-twentieth century." 510 Despite its
shortcomings, though, conventional utility regulation and the vertically
integrated industrial structure that it promoted may have reflected the most
efficient arrangements available to the United States throughout much of the
twentieth century.511 Who indeed "knows what unlikely resurrection the
Easter-tide may bring?" 512
What has not survived these cycles of regulatory reform is the notion of
a "regulatory compact." That conventional trope provides no useful guidance
in the law of regulated industries. The very presence of public utility
regulation represents not one but two decisions to forgo alternative policies
more amenable to dispute resolution by contract. Having elected neither to
build infrastructure on its own, nor to enter a bilateral contract with a private
provider, the government must be left free to implement its regulatory
statutes under the usual interpretive norms that govern all other legal
undertakings.
"Some truths are so basic that, like the air around us, they are easily
overlooked." 513 Simple in theory, the project of emulating the competitive
marketplace defies easy administration. "[N]either law nor economics has
yet devised generally accepted standards for the evaluation of [regulatory
schemes] .... ,,514 "Economic analysis and market predictions" simply do
not constitute "an exact science." 515 Regulatory law is an experiment, "as all
life is an experiment"; 516
time about the industries they regulate and to follow a "common law" body of rules or
precedents in formulating policy).
509 PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 113 (1983).
510 G6MEZ-1BAAIEZ, supra note 2, at 2.
511 See Peter Z. Grossman, Is Anything Naturally a Monopoly?, in THE END OF A
NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER
INDUSTRY 11, 31-32 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003); Paul L. Joskow,
Introducing Competition into Regulated Network Industries: From Hierarchies to
Markets in Electricity, in FIRMS, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 237, 243-54 (Glenn R.
Carroll & David J. Teece eds., 1995).
512 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 103 (1974).
513 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
514 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1968).
515 United States v. W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
516 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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The fixing of future rates always involves an element of prediction. Even
monopolies must sell their services in a market where there is competition
for the consumer's dollar and the price of a commodity affects its demand
and use. This effect may be predicted or projected, but it can be known only
from experience. 517
"The music in my heart I bore, / Long after it was heard no more." 518
The "regulatory compact" is dead. The law should find doctrinal
replacements better suited to the exigencies of deregulation. In an age of
volatile networks, the regulatory enterprise has become "so vast that fully to
comprehend it would require an almost universal knowledge ranging from
[the natural and social sciences] to the niceties of the legislative, judicial and
administrative processes of government." 519 No simplistic "compact" could
capture the complexity at stake or provide the flexibility that contemporary
regulators need. Proper regulatory design "permits rates to be experimentally
laid down and experimentally tried out" and "preserves that flexibility of
adaptation" so essential "to the life and growth of our great and changing
commerce."
520
Only by stressing the future over the past can we "find in motion what
was lost in space." 521 Let us bid farewell to the regulatory compact, faithful
but fatally flawed servant of the law. A world dedicated to efficient markets,
political freedom, and technological innovation has no place for
retrospective regulation. "For nowadays the world is lit by lightning! Blow
out your candles.., and so goodbye .... 522
517 Mkt. St. R.R. v. R.R. Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 569 (1945).
518 WORDswORTH, supra note 351, at 192.
519 Queensboro Farms Prods., Inc. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1943); cf
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 621 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("In
no other field of public service regulation is the controlling body confronted with factors
so baffling as in the natural gas industry. ").
520 Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 51 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1931); accord
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 363 (1932),
521 TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, THE GLASs MENAGERIE 97 (Robert Bray intro., 1999) (1st
ed. 1945).
522 Id.
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